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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The world will be absolutely in despair if America 
deserts it. 
− Woodrow Wilson (quoted in Luck 
1999: 16).  
     
 
This thesis is about the norm of non-intervention in American use of military force. 
How does this central part of the UN Charter affect American foreign policy thinking 
when it comes to military intervention? How does it shape US decisions regarding 
the use of force? The focus will be on the legitimisation of the use of military force in 
the Clinton and Bush administrations. The thesis will be an empirical analysis of 
differences and similarities in the two administrations’ argumentation for military 
intervention.  
The non-intervention norm has long been, and remains, fundamental to the 
international order. The norm is laid down in the UN Charter, in which it is made the 
central norm, and is also essential in other instruments of international law (Matlary 
2002: 12-13, Roberts 2004; Vincent 1974). Through this norm, the international society 
bans the use of force between states. The exceptions are given by the UN Charter: A 
state can use force in self-defence or if international peace and security are threatened 
(UN 1945). The norm of non-intervention has changed over time – not least after the 
end of the Cold War. While changes in this norm are of key important, the aim in this 
thesis is more limited. My focus is rather to illuminate possible changes or 
similarities in the American attitude to the norm in the period after the Cold War – or 
more precisely; from Clinton to Bush.  
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1.1 Research question 
The United States has used military force more than any other state in the last 50 
years – with or without the approval of the UN or NATO (Ikenberry 2004: 90). Also, 
in the post-Cold War era, the United States has on several occasions demonstrated its 
ambivalence towards international law.1 While on one side supporting international 
cooperation and law enthusiastically, the United States has on the other side on 
several occasion demonstrated a contemptuous attitude to international law 
(Murphy 2004: 2-5).  
From this point of departure, it is interesting and important to study the standing 
of the norm of non-intervention in American intervention policy today. I will focus 
on the two administrations that have been in office after the end of the Cold War: The 
administration of Bill Clinton and the administration of George W. Bush. Hence, my 
research question is as follows: 
 
Have there been any changes in the US attitude to the norm of non-intervention from Clinton 
to Bush? 
 
The research question is important because of three factors in particular. Firstly, it is 
important in light of the hegemonic state’s central position in the international 
system. Through its dominating position, the hegemon has a central, sometimes 
crucial, role in international cooperation and institution building (e.g. Cronin 2001; 
Luck 1999). Of particular importance here is the hegemon’s role in the shaping of 
international norms. The hegemonic state has, because of its powerful position, the 
opportunity to shape and affect the development of norms. Hence, we must expect 
the norm of non-intervention to be affected by the attitude of the hegemonic state. 
Because of its hegemonic position, the United States’ argumentation when the norm 
of non-intervention is violated will be of greater importance than other states’ 
argumentation (e.g. Nye 2002; Finnemore 2003). In his book The Paradox of American 
Power Joseph Nye (2002) emphasises soft power – the power of getting others to do 
what you want. The power of shaping norms is an example of such power. Nye 
                                                   
1 Important examples here are the Iraq war in 2003, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty and the 
International Criminal Court.  
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argues that if the United States represents values that others want to follow, it will 
cost less to lead: “When the society and culture of the hegemon are attractive, the 
sense of threat and need to balance it are reduced” (ibid: 17). Nye’s argument is that 
if the United States wants to remain strong, it has to pay attention to soft power as 
well as hard power, such as military and economic power.  
Secondly, as the unrivalled military hegemon, the United States has greater 
options to intervene unilaterally than any other state. In 2005, US military spending 
alone exceeded the 32 next military powers combined (SIPRI 2005). Such a military 
superpower’s view on the use of armed force against another state is of great 
importance.  
Thirdly, it is interesting to study the policy of the first two US administrations in 
the post-Cold War era – a period of US hegemony. After George W. Bush entered the 
presidential scene in 2001, it has become quite common to draw very different 
pictures of Bush and his predecessor. Bush, with his policy after 9/11, is often 
perceived as a unilateral president with contempt for international arrangements and 
a strict focus on American domestic interests. Some even use the phrase “revolution” 
about the Bush administration’s foreign policy line (e.g. Daalder and Lindsay 2003; 
Schlesinger 2005; Melby 2004). Clinton, on the contrary, has been described as a 
multilateral president being more cooperative on the international level (e.g. 
Schelsinger 2005; Malone 2003; Guardian 2002). However, I argue that this 
stereotypic presentation can be challenged. Robert Kagan (2003: 43) argues that even 
though many Europeans today view the Clinton period as a time of transatlantic 
harmony, “it was during those years that Europeans began complaining about 
American power and arrogance in the post-Cold War world”.  
 
1.2 Background 
American global power is an important characteristic of our age. No other state can 
compete realistically with the United States - neither on the military, economical, 
technological, cultural, nor the political stage (Ikenberry 2004; Knutsen 1999; Nye 
2002). By the end of the Cold War, the United States stood alone as the world’s only 
superpower, and has increasingly manifested its position since. According to 
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Ikenberry (2004: 83), “American power advantages are multidimensional, 
unprecedented, and unlikely to disappear any time soon”.  We find ourselves in the 
period Charles Krauthammer (1990) has named the unipolar moment. 
During most of the 20th century, the United States was the greatest champion of a 
rule-based order in international affairs. In particular, US engagement was crucial in 
the creation of the international order that developed after World War II. In the 
aftermath of the war, the United States enthusiastically supported the development 
of a wide range of international organisations designed to encourage cooperation 
among member states to address the many grave problems facing the post-war 
community (Murphy 2004: 3-4). The American efforts resulted in an international 
system based on legal principles – a system we to a large extent have carried with us 
up to this day. 
Despite its record as a multilateral institution builder, the United States has a 
strong unilateral, at times even isolationist, tradition. The United States itself has 
demonstrated a strong ambivalence towards acting within legal and institutional 
constraints (Ikenberry 2002; 2004). This attitude has not least been expressed in the 
United Nations – particularly in the United Nations Security Council.2 In several 
serious security conflicts, such as in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in Kosovo and in 
Iraq, the United States has demonstrated a clear willingness to block UNSC decisions 
– or act militarily without the Council’s blessing.  
 
1.2.1 US hegemony and international organisation 
The world order established after World War II presupposed at every stage of its 
development a dominant power that would be non-imperial, non-aggressive and 
committed to the proliferation of law-based international institutions (Murphy, 2004: 
2). Yet, during the post-Cold War era, this dominant power, the United States, has 
demonstrated increasing difficulty in adhering to the rule of law in international 
affairs.3 We have seen several examples of the consequences of the US’ willingness, 
or lack thereof, to recognize, cooperate and comply with central international 
                                                   
2  Of practical reasons, the abbreviation UNSC will be used extensively in this thesis. 
3 Also, under the Cold War, the United States violated international law. E.g. communist aggression in various 
parts of the world or state sponsored acts of international terrorism “sometimes resulted in unilateral action by 
the United States of questionable legality” (Murphy 2004: 4).  
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institutions. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997, The Mine Ban Treaty of 1997, International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and the Iraq war in 2003 are important cases in point (ibid: 4; 
Ikenberry 2002: 49).  
A popular explanation of US non-compliance, unilateralism and contempt for 
international law is the idea of exceptionalism. This idea has different aspects, but of 
particular interest here is the interpretation saying that the United States is so 
different from other countries that it cannot – or will not – fit comfortably into 
decision-making and norm-setting structures of global political bodies. Luck (1999) 
argues that US exceptionalism proved to be one of the most common obstacles to 
successful international cooperation in the 20th century. As the following chapters 
will show, the findings of this thesis support Luck’s view. 
Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen several examples of American use of 
armed force. The degree of compliance with the norms of the international 
community has varied. While in some cases, as in Iraq 1991, the US has used force for 
purposes that were internationally sanctioned and legitimate; some US-led uses of 
force have challenged the principle of non-intervention.4 This has been met with 
criticism by states like France, Germany and Russia, and the arguments have 
generally been based on the non-intervention norm. The US doctrine of pre-emption 
has not led to less international discord on the issue (Roberts 2004: 133-134). 5 
The US ambivalence to international organisation has not least had important 
implications for the United Nations. The world organisation’s ability to act is to a 
large extent at the great powers’ mercy. The fact that the hegemon plays a unique 
part here is beyond doubt. The United States definitely has a greater influence on the 
UN’s, and not least on the Security Council’s, actions and functional abilities, than 
any other member state. “US global leadership in the Security Council is central, and 
its ability to sway the UN membership on issues critical to it is unique” (Malone 
1998:169). When there are divisions in the United States about the degree to which it 
should be engaged in multilateral institutions or about the range of its global 
                                                   
4 The intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the intervention of Iraq in 2003 are important examples here.  
5 Pre-emption is based on the idea of preventing an attack by disabling a threatening enemy. President George W. 
Bush’s advocacy of pre-emption was encapsulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy (Roberts 2004: 144).  The 
pre-emptive strategy is known as the Bush doctrine, and will be considered more extensively in chapter 5.  
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responsibilities, the political repercussions can be felt throughout the world (Luck, 
1999: 23). 
Murphy (2004: 358-359) argues that the chances for a successful rule of law in 
international affairs will be greatly enhanced if the United States participates actively 
in the development – as it did in the comprehensive institution building after the 
Second World War. This will also be the case for the norm of non-intervention. 
Because of the hegemon state’s unique position, its attitude regarding the norm is 
important for the norm’s future development.  
 
1.2.2 Two administrations – different policy? 
The primary research question will be analysed through a comparison of the Bill 
Clinton and George W. Bush administrations’ argumentation in four cases of military 
intervention: Iraq in the 1990s, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.6 
In Kosovo and Iraq, the Security Council refused to approve the use of force. 
Nevertheless, the US chose to act without a UNSC mandate. In Iraq in 1998 and 
Afghanistan the UNSC never gave a direct mandate for the use of force. However, 
these cases are more in a grey zone regarding legality.  
Comparing these two administrations is interesting because of several factors. 
Firstly, they are both from the post-Cold War era. During this period, the US has 
established a unique position as the only remaining superpower, and it is of great 
interest to examine how these administrations have behaved in a hegemonic world 
order and to which extent international law, here represented by the norm of non-
intervention, has shaped US behaviour.  
Secondly, the two administrations represent two different political parties in US 
politics. Traditionally, the Democrats and the Republicans represent two distinct 
traditions in American foreign policy. While the Democrats traditionally have 
supported a relatively multilateral direction, the Republicans have argued for a more 
unilateral and, partly, even isolationist, line (Luck 1999). Also, as already discussed, 
it is often said today that there are great differences between the two – not least with 
respect to the US role in the international society. Stereotypically, Clinton is the 
                                                   
6 Regarding the Clinton administration’s policy in Iraq, the main focus will be on Operation Desert Fox in 
December 1998. 
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multilateralist, while Bush is the unilateralist. My aim is to find out whether the 
differences are that obvious in the field of military intervention.  
 
1.3 Theoretical framework  
My point of departure is the role of the norm of non-intervention in the 
legitimisation of the use of force. If article 2(4) in the UN Charter is strictly 
interpreted, no use of force between states is accepted. Only the Security Council can 
authorise the use of force, and military intervention without UNSC mandate is hard 
to legitimise. However, the norm is occasionally violated – with or without the 
support of the Security Council.  
Analysing norms and how they affect political decisions is challenging. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 888) ask “how do we know a norm when we see one?” 
It is not possible for a researcher to see inside the minds of the decision-makers. 
However, the spoken and written arguments are always or often available. 
 
(…) because norms by definition embody a quality of “oughtness” and shared 
moral assessment, norms prompt justifications for action and leave an 
extensive trail of communication among actors that we can study” 
                     (ibid: 892) 
 
Therefore, analysing the two administrations’ arguments for why they are justified in 
violating the norm of non-intervention is a valuable approach to my research 
question.  
At first sight, neorealist or neoliberalist approaches would be fruitful theoretical 
choices in an analysis of a state’s behaviour toward international norms. There have 
been several attempts to use such theories to explain US behaviour in the post-Cold 
war era (e.g. Mastanduno 1997; Ikenberry 2004; Nye 2002). Neorealists see norms as 
reflecting power relations in the international community, and having only limited 
influence on international relations (e.g. Florini 1996). Neoliberalists, on the other 
hand, argue that norms and international institutions can reduce transaction costs 
and uncertainty among states, and such influence actions through the idea of 
interdependence (e.g. Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1984). Additionally, we have 
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constructivists, arguing that norms define interests. According to constructivists, 
norms are socially constructed and important in the understanding of state action 
(e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).  
The traditional approaches all give useful in sights. However, the aim thesis is 
more empirically than theoretically based. My task is not to suggest theoretical 
explanations of norms or to analyse differences between theoretical norms 
perspectives, but rather to analyse empirically how the United States has legitimised 
violations of the norm of non-intervention.  
Also, I argue that US foreign policy after the Cold War is difficult to explain by 
using traditional theoretical approaches. Even though the Clinton administration 
supported multilateral initiatives and international law, there are several examples of 
the opposite. The policy of the Bush administration is also difficult to categorise. 
From a realist point of view, the Iraq policy of the United States in 2003 could be seen 
as an undisputable evidence of classic realpolitik. But why did the Bush 
administration spend several months pursuing UN authorisation for military action 
in Iraq? And why was it so important to present a multilateral coalition of allies to 
the world society? (Finnemore 2003: 23).   
Martha Finnemore’s (2003) discussion of changing patterns of intervention is very 
useful for my discussion of the norm of non-intervention. Methodologically, 
Finnemore’s perspective is more useful for my purpose than the traditional 
theoretical approaches. She analyses how actors justify norms, and how norms has 
changed. Finnemore’s constructivist perspective will make up a loose frame around 
this thesis, and will be helpful in the development of the analytical tool used to shed 
light on the research question. 
According to Finnemore, the role of international organisations and law has been 
of great importance for the changes in military intervention during the past 
centuries. Finnemore (ibid: 2-3) argues that in the post-Cold War world, states will 
only intervene in another state multilaterally. According to Finnemore, this is the 
reason why United States’ unilateral action meets so much international opposition. 
The United States has several times, such as in Iraq, acted against this established 
norm of multilateralism, and great powers such as Russia, France and Germany has 
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reacted strongly on this behaviour. On the other hand, US unilateralism challenges 
Finnemore’s multilateralist argument, because such action may indicate that the 
United States puts itself above the multilateralist consensus. Hence, one may argue 
that the power of the norm of non-intervention would not affect or restrain the 
United States to the extent Finnemore claims it to do.  
Finally, I have established five analytical categories: National security (a), 
international security (b), humanitarian concerns (c), breach with international law 
(d) and democratisation (e). The categorisation is motivated by central features of the 
intervention debate after the Cold War. For example, in the post-Cold War world, 
Finnemore (2003: 129) sees three kinds of threats capable of provoking intervention: 
Violations of territorial borders, civil conflicts involving massive humanitarian 
disasters, and massive terrorist attacks. In addition, Finnemore views proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction as a possible emerging threat. The threat categories fit 
into the categories employed in my analysis: National security, international security 
(involving both violations of territorial borders, civil conflicts and terrorist attacks), 
breach with international law (involving all of Finnemore’s threat types) and the 
humanitarian argument (involving humanitarian disasters).  
 
1.4 Method and sources  
The processes analysed in this thesis are hard to measure by numerical methods. 
Thus, a qualitative comparative case study seems to be a more fruitful 
methodological approach to the research question of this study.  
By doing a content analysis of the Clinton and Bush administrations’ 
argumentation in four military interventions, I will compare the intervention policy 
of the two administrations. Hopefully, my findings will make me able to draw some 
general conclusions about the role of the norm of non-intervention in hegemonic use 
of force.  
 
1.4.1 Methodological approach 
Qualitative research covers a wide range of approaches, but in principle, none of 
them rely on numerical measurements in the sense quantitative research does. 
Instead, qualitative researchers have traditionally focused on one or a small number 
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of cases, and emphasised depth rather than width in their analysis (King et al. 1994: 
4). In this thesis, I’m analysing two US administrations’ lines of argumentation 
regarding the use of force. Thus, this analysis must be categorised as a qualitative 
comparative case study 
The four interventions under study are different, but they all share the feature of 
being internationally disputed. None of them had a clear UN mandate, even though 
the interpretation of former UN resolutions was central in both administrations’ 
actions in Iraq.  
I therefore think it is fruitful to compare the two administrations’ policy of 
intervention in light of these interventions. My challenge is to examine whether, and 
possibly how, the two administrations differ in their argumentation for the use of 
military force. 
The four cases differ on many points, not least considering the historical context. 
However, they are important cases in this given period, and will be analysed in the 
light of central US security documents and speeches.7 Thus, I argue that the findings 
of this thesis will be robust and valid.  
 To be able to make a reliable comparison, I have made a set of argumentation 
categories, as stated above in 1.3: National security (a); international security (b); 
humanitarian concerns (c); breach with international law (d); and democratisation 
(e). In category 2, international security, I also include arguments considering regional 
security. The method leans on George and Bennett (2004: 69), who consider “asking a 
set of standardised, general questions of each case” as necessary to ensure the 
achievement of comparable data in comparative studies.   
Finally, I will attempt to organise the arguments into a hierarchy, one for each 
administration, ranging the argumentation categories after how much weight they 
are given by each administration.  This will be helpful in the comparison of the two 
administrations, and will be used as a tool to illustrate changes and similarities in the 
American argumentation. 
                                                   
7 This will be considered more comprehensively in section 1.4.2. 
Chapter one                                                                                                                                           Introduction    
 11
1.4.2 Sources 
My data material in this thesis consists of written sources exclusively. The analysis 
will mainly be based on presidential speeches, that is the presidents’ State of the 
Union addresses and central speeches before and during the four interventions 
under scrutiny. I have also analysed key official documents such as the 
administrations’ national security strategies. Additionally, the analysis is 
supplemented by speeches and statements by other officials in each administration.  
I have been able to find relevant and significant written material, and the material 
consists of both primary and secondary sources. There exists a multitude of sources 
describing the relationship between the United States and international institutions. 
There is also a relatively rich literature on the role of international law in the use of 
force. The web pages of the two administrations provide access to speeches and other 
official documents, so constituting invaluable primary sources of information.  
The analysis is based on official documents. Great amounts of primary source 
material are available on the Internet, and this material makes up the central analysis 
material in this thesis. As Bennett and George (2004: 97) underlines, a researcher 
should not assume that investigating primary sources and declassified government 
documents alone will be sufficient to find the answers to her research question:  
 
We have at times found students who have became intimately familiar with 
hard-to-get primary source materials of a case but who have only a vague 
sense of the wider context because they have not taken the relatively easy (but 
often time-consuming) step of reading the newspapers or journals from the 
period.  
 
Considering the size of this thesis, I consider newspapers, available official 
documents on the Internet and academic literature on the subject as sufficient, valid 
sources.  
This way of making use of different kinds of sources is often referred to as method 
triangulation. According to Jick (1979, quoted in Grønmo 1996: 98-99) this method 
secures a more balanced and complex evaluation of the sources, and can also 
strengthen the validity and reliability of the results. In the selection of data material, 
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a researcher has to focus on both validity and reliability. Validity refers to the 
material’s relevance for the research question. To what extent can the data material 
reveal something relevant about the research question (Hellevik 2000: 52, 102)? In 
this thesis, I consider the validity to be satisfactory. The two administration’s 
speeches, official documents and other official statements are expected to reflect the 
core of the arguments on the use of military force.  
Reliability refers to the accuracy of the data material. A high level of reliability is 
a precondition for a high level of validity. Important here is whether one can expect 
to get the same results if the analysis is repeated (ibid: 52-53). Method triangulation, 
as described above, contributes to strengthening the reliability of the analysis. I base 
my analysis on a wide selection of both primary and secondary sources, hence 
strengthening the reliability of my conclusions.  
 
1.4.3 Methodological challenges 
One important obstacle for the validity of the study is the fact that it does not 
consider the possible (and obvious) changes and events in the international society in 
the given period. We cannot overlook the fact that contextual factors affect a state’s 
policy, and to ignore 9/11 as an explanation of US foreign policy changes after 2001 
would be deeply problematic. Nevertheless, the focus of this study is on the norm of 
non-intervention as central in any situation where use of force is given serious 
consideration or actually implemented. If this norm matters in international law, it 
should be of similar importance in every case of military action.  Independent of 
historical context, it is important to study the argumentation behind violations of the 
norm of non-intervention.  Furthermore, the consequences of 9/11 do in fact make it 
even more interesting to study US argumentation regarding the use of military force 
before the terror attacks that so strongly influenced the American image of 
vulnerability and national security.  
Moreover, when analysing the foreign policy of the Bush administration, I must 
bear in mind that the debate over the post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq is not over. The interventions, Iraq in particular, are heavily debated among 
scholars, politicians and in the general public, and some may say that it is too early to 
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draw a conclusion regarding the argumentation for military action. Analysing 
administrations still in office is challenging, particularly when comparing them with 
former administrations. The secondary literature on these interventions is not as 
retrospective as the literature on the Clinton administration’s military actions. 
Nevertheless, my analysis is mainly based on speeches and strategic documents 
written by the administrations before and during particular interventions, and thus, 
the empirical point of departure is quite similar for the two administrations. I 
therefore argue that it is possible to draw well-founded conclusions. 
In every qualitative study, the researcher runs the risk of letting his or her 
personal biased views influence the analysis. This can affect both validity and 
reliability, and the researcher has to be aware of this problem during the analysis. 
Also, there is always the risk that different researchers will interpret the same 
sources differently. Nevertheless, the wide selection of both primary and secondary 
sources will reduce the risk of drawing invalid conclusions.  
 
1.5 Organisation of the study 
The following chapter presents the norm of non-intervention and the development of 
this fundamental principle, in particular during the post-Cold War Era. This chapter 
also presents the background for the analytical categories used in the analysis.  
Chapter three gives an overview of the US foreign policy tradition, and not least 
the hegemon state’s ambiguous relationship to international organisations, the 
United Nations in particular. This chapter also considers a key concept in the 
understanding of US behaviour in the international society: American 
exceptionalism. In the understanding of the US justifications of the use of force, it is 
important to define the United States as an actor in the international community. 
This, this chapter will provide important background material. 
Chapter four reviews the Clinton administration’s record in Iraq and Kosovo. The 
focus is on the controversial air strikes in Iraq in the late 1990s, particularly 
Operation Desert Fox in 1998, and the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo in 1999, 
Operation Allied Force. Chapter five gives an overview of the second Bush 
administration’s intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom, 
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and its struggle to get international support and legitimacy for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in 2003.   
Chapter six summarises the empirical findings. These findings suggest that the 
two administrations seem to differ more on form than content in their attitude to the 
norm of non-intervention. They represent different parties and certainly they differ 
in terms of rhetoric and style. But as the following chapters will show, the substance 
of their arguments is to a large extent similar. What seems to be more important than 
person and political party is the long American tradition of exceptionalism, which 
seems to affect both presidents strongly. Truly, the Clinton administration put more 
emphasis on the humanitarian aspect than does the Bush administration. And the 
Bush administration focuses more on democracy than the Clinton administration 
did. But at the end of the road, the main argument for using military force is the 
same in both administrations: National security. This argument is coloured by an 
attitude saying that if the United States see military intervention as necessary, it has 
the right to act – and will not let multilateral arrangements hinder this. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
The Norm of Non-Intervention: 
Development and Current Status 
 
 
All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
       - UN Charter, Article 2 (4) 
 
 
This chapter will discuss the development and current status of the norm of non-
intervention. Through a review of the development of this central norm in 
international affairs, the chapter will give important theoretical contributions that are 
fundamental to the empirical analysis in the following chapters. To get at the core 
significance of the norm of non-intervention, we must try to identify its central 
features and where it comes from. Hence, this chapter has the purposes of giving the 
theoretical and empirical background for the analysis in chapters four and five. 
Based on some central features of today’s intervention debate, I will present the five 
argumentation categories that constitute the main analytical tool in the analysis.  
The international society has, like any society, shared notions that shape and 
regulate the use of force. As Martha Finnemore (2003: 1) points out, one of these is 
that large-scale force is the privilege of states. States have a monopoly on the use of 
force within their own borders, and violence by non-state actors is considered 
illegitimate. According to the Westphalian principle, the state also has a monopoly 
on the use of force outside its borders. It is obliged to protect its own territory, but 
shall on the outside abstain from attacking other states (Matlary 2002: 16).  
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While interstate war was a characteristic feature of international affairs for 
centuries, the international society today bans the use of force between states. In 
1945, the UN Charter established the first international legal framework that 
outlawed war. The norm of non-intervention is fundamental in the UN Charter 
through Article 2 [4], and is also laid down in other instruments of international law. 
When a state signs the UN Charter, it pledges not to use or threaten to use force 
against any other state – except in self-defence8 or where international peace and security 
are threatened.9 Under the Charter paradigm UN member states agree to settle all 
disputes by peaceful means, and to refrain from the use of force in their international 
relations (UN 1945; Chandler 2002: 159; Matlary 2002: 13; Voeten 2005: 529).  
Despite the fact that the norm of non-intervention has long been fundamental to 
international order, its observance has never been perfect. Security concerns and a 
wide variety of other reasons have often led states to intervene by force in other 
states – even in circumstances different from self-defence against an armed attack or 
the protection of international peace and security. This is a fact also in our time, and 
after the Cold War, we have seen more interventions than ever before since the end 
of World War II (Roberts 2004: 135; Matlary 2002: 15).  
Military intervention involves violation of both the principle of sovereignty and 
the principle of self-determination. Hence, intervention always brings about 
extended normative discussions. Over time, some normative claims become less 
powerful or disappear entirely – and others gain power. For example, after World 
War II, particularly after 1990, claims about human rights have challenged assertions 
about sovereignty and self-determination (Finnemore, 2003: 6, 21). 
The norm of non-intervention is strong in the international society. An evidence 
of this is the fact that when the norm is violated, states are called upon, and/or feel 
compelled, to justify and give reasons for their actions. We may expect a norm-
violating state to use arguments that it both supports itself and that other states will 
find acceptable and legitimate. In light of this, it is interesting to see how the United 
States justifies norm-breaking behaviour. The fact that the hegemonic state sees a 
                                                   
8 Article 51 declare the member states’ “inherent right of self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security” (UN 1945).  
9 Article 42 (UN 1945). 
Chapter two       The Norm of Non-Intervention 
 17
need to actively justify its actions is itself an indication of the standing of the norm. 
However, the explicit argumentation is the most important material in the 
understanding of the US attitude to the norm of non-intervention.  
The chapter starts with a review of the history of non-intervention from Grotius 
to the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, I will consider the norm’s current status and 
the role of the United Nations Security Council as the observer of the norm of non-
intervention. Finally, I summarize the chapter and establish the implications for the 
empirical analysis by presenting the analytical categories.  
 
2.1 Non-intervention from Grotius to the 21. Century  
The norm of non-intervention derives from and protects the principle of state 
sovereignty. Vincent (1974: 15) underlines that “to ask what areas the principle of 
non-intervention protects is equivalent to asking what matters are within the 
domestic jurisdiction of states”. Power asymmetries are colossal in the international 
system, and the vast majority of the world’s sovereign states could not defend 
themselves if a great power decided to intervene. Hence, the norm is the necessary 
condition for sovereignty among states (Neumann 1997: 43; Finnemore, 2003: 7).  
In the study of international affairs, the norm of non-intervention has been 
brought to the fore by the English school or the Grotian tradition. This tradition 
embraces the conception that norms guide the relationship between states. The norm 
of non-intervention is one of these constraining and constituting norms; defining 
limits for or rather prohibiting the use of force between states (Matlary 2002: 35). 
Vincent (1974) sees the development of the norm of non-intervention as a 
succession of generations of political thinkers. First, there was Hugo Grotius, the first 
to conceive of international law as existing between sovereign states. The founding 
father of international law contributed strongly to the development of new political 
and moral standards in international affairs. In particular, respect for state 
sovereignty and treaties were of great importance.  
In addition to Grotius, Vincent regards Hobbes and Pufendorff as precursors of 
the non-intervention norm with their ideas of natural equality and a state of nature. 
Second, Wolff’s and Vattel’s writings contain the first explicit manifestations of the 
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principle on non-intervention. Wolff formulated the concept of the civitas maxima, a 
great society brought about by a quasi-agreement between nations from which the 
voluntary law of nations could be derived. Vattel added to Wolff’s doctrine of 
natural rights a general law requiring respect for those rights. Third, the positivist 
lawyers of the 19th century observed that the internal order of states seemed to rest 
on internal will, indicating that other states do not have the right to interfere in 
domestic affairs. Vincent also emphasises the theorists Cobden, Mill, Kant and 
Mazzini as promoters of state observance of the principle of non-intervention 
(Vincent 1974; Neumann 1997: 43). 
 In her study of changing patterns of intervention, Finnemore (2003: 107-108) 
finds that before the French Revolution, neither diplomats nor statesmen perceived 
the internal organization or government of states to be a threat or grounds for 
military intervention. After the Napoleonic Wars, internal relations were seen as one 
of the premier threats in international affairs. Coupled with the increased difficulty 
of annexing or conquering states that followed the territorial balance of The Vienna 
Congress, this cleared way for the construction of “intervention” – a category distinct 
from war.  
 
Military intervention to influence or alter domestic governing arrangements, 
leaving boundaries intact, provided a potential solution to the problem of 
internal threats and still respected the fundamental rules and norms of the 
systemic order.  
                          (ibid: 118) 
 
International law made the concept comprehensible and credible by language and 
ideology. Military intervention was soon accepted as an important tool of foreign 
policy. Nevertheless, the rules of intervention were strongly debated throughout the 
post-Napoleonic period. At the eye of the storm was the question of what made 
intervention legitimate. One important point is, however, that there was no 
normative difference between unilateral and multilateral intervention in the 
concept’s first period. In fact, it was not until after the Cold War that unilateralism 
became normatively problematic for states. This was a result of the fact that 
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international organisations got a dramatically increased role in the structuring of 
interventions from the beginning of the 1990s (Finnemore 2003: 117-121, 124). 
Finnemore (ibid: 86-87) emphasises two components that influence patterns of 
intervention and that have changed over the past centuries. Firstly, the 
understanding of the mechanisms by which order is to be maintained has changed, 
and prescriptions for intervention have changed accordingly. Secondly, there have 
also been changes in the notions of domestic rule conducive to international order 
and stability. The Cold War serves as a good example. During this period, the United 
States and the USSR viewed respectively capitalist and communist states as threats to 
international stability. As a result, the two super powers on several occasions 
intervened to install more “preferable” governments. As we shall see, there is an 
interesting parallel in the post-Cold War era: The persistent focus on the spread of 
democracy and liberal values that is apparent in both the Clinton and Bush 
administrations, particularly in the latter. Moreover, the idea that domestic rule is 
central to international order is at the heart of the post-Cold War debates over 
intervention. This feature forms the basis for one of my categories used in the 
analysis: Democratisation. In chapter four and five, we will see that this argument is 
frequently used by both administrations, particularly in their Iraq policy.  
 
2.1.1 After the Cold War: Humanitarian intervention 
During the Cold War, collective humanitarian intervention was not a real option. 
There was neither will nor possibility to intervene for humanitarian reasons, because 
no state wanted to risk a “warm” world war for this case. The UN members viewed 
humanitarian intervention as a colonial remnant, and strongly disapproved of the 
phenomenon (DUPI 1999: 12). Also, the Security Council was paralysed by the 
bipolar tensions, and before 1990, the Council adopted only 22 resolutions under 
Chapter VII. Only a minority of these authorised the use of force (Voeten 2005: 530).10 
With the end of the Cold War, world politics became less confrontational, and the 
Security Council could again show itself as a relevant actor on the international 
arena. In the post-Cold War era, we have witnessed a considerable increase in 
                                                   
10 The two most important exceptions were the peacekeeping force in Congo and the Korean War in 1950 (Voeten 
2005: 530).  
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international engagement in armed conflicts and humanitarian crises. On several 
occasions, the Council has mandated the use of force, such as in Somalia, Bosnia and 
Rwanda. 
Nevertheless, the Security Council’s efficiency in reacting on massive human 
rights violations has been limited. Kosovo and Rwanda serves as severe examples of 
this. In Rwanda, the UNSC didn’t act in time to prevent the humanitarian 
catastrophe. In Kosovo, the UNSC didn’t act at all, resulting in a NATO intervention 
without UN mandate.  Lack of consent in the Security Council is one explanation of 
the UN’s limited ability to act in emergency situations. There has been discord on 
both what defines a threat against international peace and security, and when it is 
legitimate to violate the principle of non-intervention (Rawski and Miller, 2004: 358-
360; DUPI: 36-40).  
The interventions since the end of the Cold War have been different both in terms 
of context and results. According to a DUPI report (1999: 13), this underlines two 
problems. Firstly, how can legal limitations of uses of force without UNSC mandate 
be combined with the increasing desire to protect civilian individuals against human 
rights violations? And secondly, even in cases when there is a will to provide such 
protection, there exist political and instrumental limitations on the international 
society’s ability to offer it. These questions will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
2.1.2 Humanitarian intervention 
The argument of humanitarian intervention makes up the second analytical category 
in this thesis. The phenomenon of humanitarian intervention has influenced the 
debate about non-intervention since the time of Grotius. He defended a limited right 
to humanitarian intervention if a suppressed population asked another state for help 
to fight the suppressive power. When a state was torn by civil war, Grotian doctrine 
allowed intervention by outside states on the just side. This idea of humanitarian 
intervention had a strong position among scholars of international law up until the 
end of the 19th century. During the 20th century, the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention disappeared from state practice and its position in international law 
weakened (Vincent 1974; 283-284; DUPI 1999: 11-12; Brunnée and Toope 2004: 408).  
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During the 1990s, we saw many advocates for a right to wage war to prevent 
states from human rights violation. States have come under increasing pressure to 
intervene militarily for humanitarian reasons, and we have witnessed several cases 
where states have intervened to protect citizens other than their own (Chandler 2002; 
Finnemore, 2003: 52; Matlary 2002). Roberts (2003: 146) defines humanitarian 
intervention as:  
 
(…) coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in 
another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of 
preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants. 
 
The dilemma of humanitarian interventions is how to handle the conflict between 
the norm of non-intervention and the international responsibility for preventing 
human rights violations. 
Article 2 [4] of the UN Charter must be seen as prohibiting all interstate use of 
armed force, included humanitarian intervention, without authorisation by the 
UNSC. Nevertheless, there is a debate on whether humanitarian intervention can be 
consistent with Article 2 [4] even without this blessing. Arguments for humanitarian 
intervention outside the Security Council are often related to the protection of human 
rights and a general responsibility for international peace and security when the 
UNSC is unable to act. One argument against this attitude is that the prohibition of 
the use of force and the principle of non-intervention are so important in customary 
international law that they are valid even when the UNSC system of collective 
security is ineffective (DUPI 1999: 85-86) .11  
The core of the debate on humanitarian intervention is often the conflict between 
the concern of order and the concern of justice. Is it more important to maintain 
international stability and order than to protect suffering and threatened people in a 
conflict?12 A difficult aspect of this relates to how we consider the world order of the 
21st century. Is it built upon states and state’s rights, or are we moving towards an 
                                                   
11 International law consists of treaties and customary law. Murphy (2004:5) defines customary international law 
as an unwritten product of interactions between states undertaken with a sense of legal obligation. 
12 For a more detailed discussion of order and justice, see Hedley Bull (1977): The Anarchical Society: A study of 
Order in World Politics.  
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order based on the rights of the individual? This is an important question of 
consideration in the weighing between order and justice. Since 1945, the principle of 
human security has gained more importance at the expense of state sovereignty. The 
individual is to an increasing extent seen as a significant subject in international 
affairs, and there is a tendency to consider the individual’s security and rights as 
fundamental to international peace and stability. De facto rule over a territory no 
longer legitimises the denial of justice or human rights violations. The international 
society has a responsibility to protect the individual (DUPI 1999: 14-17; Forsythe 2000: 
21-22; Chandler 2002: 12-13, 120; Bannon 2006).13 
It is possible to distinguish between the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian 
intervention. The legality is defined by the norms of international law, and is a 
juridical term. An intervention’s legitimacy is more politically or morally based, but 
could also include juridical principles. This is a less precise and formal concept, and 
the legitimacy of an intervention will often be controversial. An intervention could 
never be said to be absolutely legitimate, but rather to be “considered legitimate in 
general” (DUPI 1999: 23-24). As we will see in the empirical analysis, the distinction 
between what is legal and what is legitimate has been very relevant in US 
intervention policy. Both in Kosovo and Iraq, the US argued that the legitimate reasons 
to intervene were present – even without the legal foundation provided by the UNSC. 
Here, we see the link to traditional view of US exceptionalism, implying that the US 
has some kind of unique mandate to decide when to act or not.  I will discuss this 
phenomenon more comprehensively in chapter three. 
The arguments for the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions without a UNSC 
mandate can be strong in cases of extreme human rights violations. However, the 
legality of such interventions is highly disputed, and the UN Charter leaves no doubt 
about the high standing of the norm of non-intervention. Yet, this principle of 
international law may change according to state practice on the field (DUPI 1999: 26-
27). 
The quoted DUPI-report (1999: 94-98) asks whether state practice in the 1990s has 
developed a right to humanitarian intervention without UNSC authorisation. The 
                                                   
13 The concept of a reponsibility to protect was introduced by the International Commission of Intervention and 
State Sovereignty in 2001 (Bannon 2006). This will be considered later in this chapter.  
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report concludes that this is not the case. According to international law, no state has 
the right to intervene in another state without a green light from the Security Council 
– even if the purpose of intervention is humanitarian. State practice after the Cold 
War seems to imply an increasing acceptance of humanitarian interventions in 
exceptionally severe cases. Nevertheless, this is not sufficient evidence for a legally 
established right of humanitarian intervention without UNSC approval (ibid.). 
Hence, e.g. the intervention Kosovo in 1999 must be seen as a violation of 
international law.  
 
2.2 The role of the United Nations Security Council  
The UN Charter gave the Security Council the task of maintaining international 
peace and security. It has the legislative authority to take decisions binding all 
members, and it can take action against other states. After the Cold War, the Council 
has authorised the use of force several times, such as in Iraq, Haiti and Somalia 
(DUPI 1999: 34; Murphy 2004: 31, 57; Roberts 2004: 137-138).  
The UN Charter specifies two general circumstances in which force may be 
justified. Firstly, every state has the inherent right to individual or collective self-
defence in case of an armed attack. This right is defined in Article 51. Secondly, the 
Security Council can sanction the use of force if it defines a situation as being a threat 
to international peace and security (Voeten 2005: 530). This is explicitly stated in 
Article 42:  
 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action 
by air, sea, or land forces as may necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.14   
                 (UN 1945) 
 
                                                   
14 Article 41 says that “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are 
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply 
such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
Postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” (UN 
1945). 
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However, the UNSC’s authority is limited to cases mentioned in chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, and the Council can only act if none of the veto powers use their 
authority.15 This clearly limits the UNSCs ability to act, and makes up a grave 
challenge for the Council. With a Security Council paralysed by discord, what should 
the international community do to handle cases of genocide and grave human rights 
violations (DUPI 1999: 20, 35)?    
Despite its strong legitimising role, the UNSC has a grave problem when it comes 
to actual realisation of military operations. The Council has no military forces at its 
disposal; it can only mandate the use of force. Consequently, the Council’s factual 
ability to act is at the member states’ mercy. Even though article 43 in the Charter 
calls on the member states to make armed forces available to the UN, there are no 
concrete agreements binding the states to make such contributions. Consequently, 
the Council cannot command member states to commit their armed forces to a UN 
military enforcement action. As a result, several of the UNSC’s humanitarian 
interventions have been characterised by too little action too late. This was the case 
both in Somalia and Rwanda (DUPI 1999: 62-63, 79; Murphy 2004: 143-144). 
We cannot escape the fact that the Security Council is a political organ. It consists 
of states with widely different interests, and its decision-making procedures mirror 
the distribution of power in world politics. Furthermore, the Council has only the 
power and strength provided by its member states at all times. This dilemma has 
made the UNSC unable to act on several occasions where the UN Charter demanded 
action (DUPI 1999: 76-77).  
Despite the UNSC’s role as the legitimiser of the use of force, the United States 
has acted without UN mandate on several occasions. However, as we will see, UNSC 
resolutions have often been central in US argumentation. Hence, the UNSC is an 
important part of the analytical category Breach with international law. Moreover, it is 
important to see if and how the United States refers to the UNSC in general in the 
justification of the use of force.  
 
                                                   
15 The veto powers are the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia.  
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2.3 A changing norm 
Patterns of military intervention have changed over time. Today, states intervene for 
reasons and in ways that were unimaginable one hundred or two hundred years ago. 
Finnemore (2003) argues that many of the changed patterns of military intervention 
are results of new understandings about the purposes to which states can and should 
use force. According to Finnemore, the role of international organisations and law 
has been of great importance in this development. Why, asks Finnemore (2003:23) 
did the Bush administration spend several months pursuing UN authorisation for 
military action in Iraq? And why was it so important to present a multilateral 
coalition of allies to the world society? Ikenberry (2004: 108) argues that the decision 
by the Bush administration to go back to the Security Council to get support for its 
Iraq confrontations demonstrates that even a UN-reluctant administration 
understands the pros of the legitimate use of force. 
Finnemore’s argument is that to be acceptable and legitimate today, humanitarian 
intervention must be multilateral. States will only intervene in another state 
multilaterally, and only with authorisation from an international organisation. 
Unilateral action is not accepted today: “It was precisely the successful export of 
multilateral norms that made George W. Bush’s unilateral assertions so controversial 
and politically costly” (Finnemore 2003: 135). Considering the recent history of US-
led interventions, Finnemore’s arguments are both interesting and debatable. Her 
conclusion makes a useful point of departure for the empirical analysis of this thesis.  
Over time, interstate rules about when intervention is legitimate or necessary are 
developed and established. Finnemore (ibid: 5) attaches these rules closely to power 
and interest. Rules about intervention are strongly if not completely shaped by the 
actions of powerful states with the actual capacity to intervene. If the great powers of 
today by their intervention practice show an increasing willingness to intervene for 
humanitarian reasons, this is more likely to be an established norm than if this 
attitude only can be found among countries with scarce military resources. As 
chapter four and five will show, the United States has used the humanitarian 
argument in all the four interventions analysed in this thesis. Still, it seems as if this 
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argument to a large extent is used strategically and to support arguments based on 
security.  
It will also be interesting to see whether the Bush Doctrine of pre-emption will 
have consequences for the status of the non-intervention norm16. According to 
Roberts (2004: 133), this doctrine appears to challenge the meaning of self-defence as 
outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.  
The UN Charter made human rights and the protection of the individual key 
elements in international law and affairs. The responsibility for protecting human 
rights is shared between the states and the international society. Every state is subject 
to international supervision, and the international society has a legitimate interest of 
taking action when states violate human rights and international law (DUPI 1999: 
47).  Today, this focus on individual security is more obvious than ever. Chandler 
(2002: 120) points at a degrading of border sovereignty after the Cold War:  
 
Since the early 1990s, international relations have been transformed through 
the development of new norms and practices established with the intention of 
protecting human rights by extending the reach of “international justice”.  
Justice and rights protection no longer stop at the borders of the nation-state. 
             (Chandler 2002: 120) 
 
In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
introduced the concept of a responsibility to protect. The report states that when a state 
fails to protect its own citizens, the sovereign right to non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect (Bannon 2006: 1161). 
Nevertheless, the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention have 
traditionally a strong position in international law (DUPI 1999: 48). The UN has on 
several occasions stated this explicitly, both in the UN Charter (Article 2 [4]), in the 
Declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention (UN General Assembly 1965), in 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
                                                   
16 Pre-emption refers to a direct, immediate, specific threat that must be stopped at once. It is worth noticing the 
distinction between preventive and pre-emptive. Preventive wars refer to potential, future, and therefore 
speculative, threats. The Bush-administration prefers to talk about pre-emptive war or strike (Schlesinger 2005: 23). 
According to Schlesinger (ibid.), the distinction between pre-emptive and preventive is the “distinction between 
legality and illegality”, referring to the latter as the illegal type. 
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and Cooperation among States (UN General Assembly 1970), and in the Declaration 
on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of 
States (UN General Assembly 1981).   
Humanitarian intervention became a hot topic at the United Nations World 
Summit in September 2005. The Summit culminated with an agreement that the 
international community, acting through the UN, bears a responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity when their own governments fail to do so. The agreement announced a 
willingness to take collective action through the UNSC to give such protection if 
peaceful means prove insufficient. The motivating force behind the summit 
agreement was the UN’s inaction in the face of severe atrocities, such as in Rwanda 
and Srebrenica (UN General Assembly 2005; Bannon 2006).  
Bannon (ibid: 1158) sees the agreement as strengthening the development of a 
new international norm regarding humanitarian protection, hence being an 
important contribution to international law. However, she argues that the agreement 
strengthens the legal justification for unilateral and regional action if the UN fails to  
act: “In cases of UN inaction, would-be unilateral actors can point to an explicit 
failure to fulfill a duty”.  
According to Chandler (2002: 121), the Kosovo and Afghanistan conflicts are often 
reckoned to have demonstrated some of the most positive features of the new age of 
human rights protections. But Chandler also emphasise how these conflicts have 
indicated potential problems with these new trends. First, while the conflicts may 
have shown the victory of “international justice” over sovereignty, they have also 
brought the relationship between “international justice” and international law to the 
fore. Under which circumstances can military action be justified without Security 
Council authorisation – the fundamental barrier against the use of force in 
international law? Second, the two conflicts question the perceived end of 
sovereignty:  
 
(…) it may be that we are seeing a redistribution of sovereign power; or rather, 
the acceptance of sovereign inequality. The growing acceptance of a moral 
right of some states to unilaterally or collectively exercise military power to 
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uphold “international justice” and human rights indicates that sovereignty, or 
the exercise of state power, is being transformed. While, for some states, 
sovereignty is being limited, for others, it is increasingly free from traditional 
international constraints.  
        (Chandler 2002: 122) 
 
This last feature was evident in the Western response to the 9/11 attacks, where it 
was assumed that the United States, together with Britain, had the right to remove 
Taliban from Afghanistan – hence violating Afghan sovereignty. This is interesting to 
see as an expression of US exceptionalism. By placing itself above international 
constraints, the United States gives itself a unique mandate to act whenever and 
wherever it finds it necessary.  Shaw (quoted in Chandler 2002: 137) fear that without 
sovereign equality, some states would be free to declare their own particular interests 
as law, resulting in the end of certainty and consensus about international law.  
 
2.4. Analysing the norm in use 
The international principle of non-intervention may be changed by state practice. 
This depends on the attitude taken by the states when they act against current norms. 
According to the International Court of Justice, interventions that are legally justified 
by a claimed right to intervene, may lead to the development of new international 
norms if this attitude to intervention is shared by other states. On the contrary, 
interventions justified on moral or political grounds, or interventions meeting 
international opposition, confirm rather than undermine the non-intervention norm 
(DUPI 1999: 91). 
As Finnemore (2003: 5) points out, rules about intervention are strongly, if not 
completely, shaped by the actions of powerful states with the actual capacity to 
intervene. Because of the United States’ military hegemony, this state plays a central, 
if not the lead part, in this picture.  Therefore, it is interesting and important to 
analyse the argumentation behind American use of military force.  
Roberts (2004: 135) argues that the United States in the 21st century views the 
whole world as its sphere of influence: “If the United States can be threatened by 
terrorists or by what it defines as “rogue states” half a world away, then it seeks 
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some right to intervene half a world away”. According to Roberts, this challenges the 
post-1945 normative framework limiting the resort to force. Some post-Cold War US-
led uses of force have posed problems for the non-intervention norm, and with the 
Bush administration, the doctrine of pre-emption has added to the litany of such 
problems. Ash (2004: 109) notes that there is a fear of the dangerous precedent this 
doctrine could set: “Any state could strike at any other, claiming that it was thereby 
pre-empting a potential terrorist threat”. It is not difficult to see what grave 
challenges such behaviour would pose for the non-intervention norm in its 
traditional form.    
I will end this chapter by explaining the motivation behind the analytical 
categories established in chapter one: National security (a), international security (b), 
humanitarian concerns (c), breach with international law (d) and democratisation (e). 
The categorisation is motivated by central features of the intervention debate after 
the Cold War, as discussed in this chapter. 
 
2.4.1 National security 
As this chapter has shown, protection of national interests and borders has 
historically been the most compelling reason for inter-state use of force. In the post-
Cold War era, inter-state wars are the exception rather than the rule. However, we 
have seen examples of the use of national security as an argument for using military 
force. US military interventions after the 9/11 attacks serve as examples here. 
Therefore, the argument of national security is an important factor to include in the 
analysis. The argument is relevant not least considering one of the exceptions from 
the norm of non-intervention: Self-defence, as stated in Article 51 (UN 1945). Not 
least is this interesting in light of the Bush administration’s doctrine of pre-emptive 
strike. Roberts (2004: 133) asserts that the doctrine appears to challenge the meaning 
of self-defence as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
 
2.4.2 International security 
“Threats against international peace and security” is the other of the two exceptions 
from the norm of non-intervention (UN 1945). The phrase is central in UN language, 
and has also been used by states in relation to international terrorist threats and 
weapons of mass destruction. Based on this, it is interesting to see how frequently 
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and in which way the argument of international security is used by the United States, 
not least considering its mighty position in the international community. Also, this 
category could be helpful to see if and how the United States refers to the United 
Nations Security Council. This is important because of the UNSC’s position as the 
top legitimiser of the use of force in the international community. 
 
2.4.3 Humanitarian concerns 
As we have seen in this chapter, humanitarian aspects have become central in the 
intervention debate after the Cold War. The idea of the international community’s 
responsibility to protect the individual when the state fails to do so, is seemingly 
gaining increasing support (See e.g. Bannon 2006; Finnemore 2003; DUPI 1999). In 
light of this essential role of humanitarian intervention in the debate over the 
international use of armed force, I think the category of humanitarian concerns is 
important to include in the analysis. To analyse the role of humanitarian arguments 
in US intervention discourse is not least interesting considering the above mentioned 
importance of great powers in the shaping of international norms.  
 
2.4.4 Breach with international law 
States often refer to international law and violations of this in their justifications of 
military intervention. Roberts (2004: 56) notes that “the impressive growth of 
international law in the UN era” has contributed to advancing grounds for 
justification of use of military force. If a state persistently violates international legal 
norms in fields such as arms control or humanitarian law, what should the response 
of other states be? Despite the international acceptance of the norm of non-
intervention, sometimes states or international bodies may perceive a need to use 
force against a state that denies desisting law violations, “yet it may not always be 
possible to obtain Security Council authorization for it” (ibid.).  This indicates a 
tendency of states using the argument of international law in lack of a direct legal 
mandate from the Security Council. For example, international law, represented by 
former UN resolutions, has frequently been used to justify US action in Iraq.  
Taking this into consideration, I find that the argument of breach of international 
law is important to include in my categorisation of US arguments.  
Chapter two       The Norm of Non-Intervention 
 31
2.4.5 Democratisation 
As Finnemore (2003) points out, during the last centuries there have been changes in 
the notions of domestic rule conducive to international order and stability. For 
example, during the Cold War, the United States and the USSR viewed respectively 
capitalist and communist states as threats to international stability. Today, this 
combat between communism and capitalism is history. Nevertheless, the spread of 
democratic and liberal values has always been, and still is, a central part of US 
foreign policy (e.g. Luck 1999; Kupchan 2003; Mead 2001). I therefore regard the 
argument of democratisation as an important factor to include in my analysis. As the 
next chapters will show, this focus on democratization is definitely evident in the 
Clinton and Bush administrations.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the development and current status of the norm of non-
intervention, and hence provided important theoretical and empirical background 
for the analysis in chapters four and five. Based on this, I have established five 
analytical categories that will be used as tools in the analysis.  
The norm of non-intervention has changed over time, and so have the reasons to 
intervene. While states for centuries intervened for power, wealth and the protection 
of borders, protection of the individual is today the main concern of the international 
community. However, state interests still counts, and the UNSC’s ability to act is at 
the member state’s mercy. This challenges both the international community’s ability 
to serve its responsibility to protect and the norm of non-intervention as a guiding 
principle in international law regarding the use of force. Not least has US 
unilateralism challenged the norm of non-intervention by indicating that certain 
states have the power of and right to putting the norm aside if necessary.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
Leadership with ambiguity 
 
 
Torn between nostalgia for a pristine past and 
yearning for a perfect future, American thought 
has oscillated between isolationism and 
commitment. 
                       – Henry Kissinger (1994: 18) 
 
 
This chapter discusses the faceted US leadership in the 20th and 21st century. I will 
first shortly consider some broad lines in the American foreign policy tradition, 
basically leaning on Walter Russel Mead’s book Special Providence (2001). I then move 
on to a discussion of one of the key explanations of the US reluctance to international 
organisation: US exceptionalism.  
The chapter is important because, as we will see, US culture and ideology in 
general has shaped the United States’ own view of their role in the world. This has 
affected the US attitude to international organisation, including the relevance of 
international law to the US. Hence, a clear image of how the United States place itself 
in the international community is key to understand US attitude to the norm of non-
intervention.  
The question of how the United States should engage the world is as old as the 
US Constitution. During the first century of the new nation, the foreign policy debate 
was mainly between advocates of American expansionism and those being worried 
that the United States would loose its uniqueness, its exceptionalism, if it followed an 
expansionist path. George Washington wanted the United States to avoid permanent 
alliances with other countries, and complete neutrality towards Europe. 
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Washington’s position became the cornerstone in American foreign policy (Daalder 
and Lindsay 2003).  
With the Spanish-American War and President Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary of 
the Monroe Doctrine, internationalists and the imperialist cause got their first 
triumph over isolationists in the struggle to define US interest.17 After a period of 
Wilsonian internationalism in the early 1900s, isolationist sentiments started to rise in 
the 1930s. But with Pearl Harbour, the young nation was forced into a new world 
war, from which the United States emerged even more powerful and dominant than 
ever (Stephanson 1995; Daalder and Lindsay 2003). After World War II, the United 
States received a unique position in the international community. The United States 
secured an unchallenged leadership in the West – a bloc of countries that included 
“the richest, most dynamic, and most intellectually advanced societies in the world 
(Mead 2001: 10). Since then, disengaging from the world has never been a realistic 
alternative for the United States. The question has rather been how the United States 
should engage the world (Daalder and Lindsay 2003). This how will be central in the 
analysis of differences and similarities between the Clinton and Bush administrations 
concerning the use of force.  
The relationship with the United Nations is a central part of US leadership after 
World War II, and the at times tensed US relationship with the Security Council is of 
particular interest considering the Council’s role as the key legitimiser of 
international use of force. The US-UN relationship will therefore be considered in 
this chapter. I will present historic lines in this ambiguous relationship from 1945 to 
the end of the Cold War. After this, we will move on to the post-Cold War period, 
where the main focus will be the use of force. This is important background material 
for the understanding of the American attitude to international organisation.  
 
3.1 American foreign policy tradition 
According to Walter Russell Mead (2001), a widespread perception among American 
policy-makers and experts is that foreign policy played only a marginal role in the 
                                                   
17 The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed in 1823 by President James Monroe. The doctrine declared that Europe 
must not become entangled in American affairs, and that the whole Western Hemisphere was an American 
sphere of interest. The doctrine warned the European powers that the United States would go to war to uphold 
the inviolability of the Western Hemisphere (Kissinger 1994: 35).  
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United States before World War II. Mead, on the contrary, observes that foreign 
policy questions influenced American politics even long before World War I. Mead 
also finds that American foreign policy thinking has been relatively stable, from 
George Washington and up until George W. Bush. The leading statesmen before and 
during the Civil War were often more devoted to foreign policy questions than the 
leaders of the Cold War. Almost every administration from Washington to Wilson 
sent American troops abroad or faced war crises with a European great power18. 
Mead identifies four American ways of looking at foreign policy that have 
competed and coexisted through two centuries. Hamiltonians, named after the US 
politician Alexander Hamilton, is commercially oriented, and regard a strong 
relationship between business and the national government as the key to both 
domestic stability and effective action internationally. Wilsonians, after president 
Woodrow Wilson, think that the United States has both a moral obligation and 
national interest in spreading American values throughout the world, such as 
democracy, self-government and the rule of law. The idea is that the spread of these 
values will create a peaceful, law-abiding international community. Mead asserts 
that from the end of Cold War to the end of the Clinton administration, 
Wilsonianism battled with Hamiltonianism to be the dominant force in American 
foreign policy.  
The third direction is Jeffersonianism, after the third US president, Thomas 
Jefferson. This direction represents scepticism towards what they see as risky 
engagement abroad. Jeffersonians believe that American foreign policy should focus 
on safeguarding US values at home. Instead of spreading democracy elsewhere, the 
US should lead the world by example. Finally, we have Jacksonianism, named after 
US president Andrew Jackson. Jacksonians hold the protection of the physical 
security and economic well being of the American people as the number one priority 
of US foreign policy. To reach this end, any means are permissible – as long as they 
don’t violate certain moral feelings. As we shall see in the next chapters, this 
particular direction is useful in the understanding of US intervention policy after the 
                                                   
18 US troops were sent to e.g. Haiti, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, Colombia, Argentina and Peru, and the United 
States faced severe crises with great European powers: Great Britain, Spain (The Spanish-American War in 1898) 
and France (Mead 2001: 24-26).  
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Cold War. The analysed argumentation indicates that in the protection of US national 
security, the United States doesn’t see the norm of non-intervention as a sufficient 
hinder against the use of force. Leira (2003: 361) argues that the value of this school 
for the understanding of US foreign policy has become even more obvious after 9/11: 
“The Jacksonian features in the speeches of Bush and Rumsfeld are blatant to the 
extent that it borders the grotesque” [My translation]. 
The four directions clearly differ on their view on how United States should 
behave in the international system. Hamiltonianism and Wilsonianism embrace 
universal values and want the United States to build an international order and 
accommodate itself to the rest of the world to maintain that order. The supporters of 
the two other schools resist any such thought of US accommodation. They believe 
that the object of foreign policy should be to defend American values rather than to 
extend them abroad (Mead 2001: 175, 238). However, the four schools share the main 
characteristic of US foreign policy tradition: US exceptionalism. They all embrace the 
notion of a United States with a unique position in the world.  
 
3.2 US exceptionalism – the belief in American uniqueness 
Since the early settlers, the US has seen itself as a great experiment in personal liberty 
that has implications for the planet. Both mass and elite viewed the United States as a 
beacon of freedom to the world. Gradually, the sense of US exceptionalism has 
developed in the American society, and this belief in the exceptional freedom and 
goodness of the American people is at the heart of the dominant American political 
culture (Forsythe, 2000: 141-142).  
In his book “Manifest Destiny” (1995), Anders Stephanson emphasises the 
American view of the United States as God’s chosen nation, and how this has formed 
American foreign policy thinking. This is to a large extent the core of US 
exceptionalism. Stephanson argues that the American belief in a “manifest destiny”, 
the United States’ providential assigned role in the world, is of vital importance for 
how the United States understands itself in the world.  
During the United State’s first 130 years or so, the most common foreign policy 
debate was between the imperialists and the anti-expansionists. Then, with 
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Woodrow Wilson came the idea of liberal internationalism. Like all his predecessors, 
President Woodrow Wilson had an unshakable belief in American exceptionalism. 
What made Wilson different from former presidents was his view of the US 
“manifest destiny” as an incentive to lead and improve the world. To him, this 
special mission was precisely what defined “America” (Stephanson 1995: XII; 
Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 6).  As the nation chosen by the finger of God, the United 
States was bound to make a good example for the world. This vision has led to two 
different ways of acting toward the rest of the world, according to Stephanson (ibid.): 
“The first was to unfold into an exemplary state separate from the corrupt and fallen 
world, letting others emulate it as best they can. The second, Wilson’s position, was 
to push the world along by means of regenerative intervention”.  
As Luck (1999: 16-18) points out, the US has had remarkable success in exporting 
its values and culture. Wilson phrased that “America is great because of the ideas she 
has conceived”, and for most of the last century, the US has made the spread of these 
ideas a world mission. Even isolationists in the interwar period spoke of an America 
that would be ready to defend its core interests and principles whenever and 
wherever it deemed necessary. According to Luck, we have witnessed a foreign 
policy that has been drawn with sweeping, at times messianic strokes – a policy 
suitable for what former president Bill Clinton has termed “the indispensable nation” 
(ibid.). 
 
3.3 Exceptionalism and International Organisation 
One central idea of American exceptionalism claims that the US is so different from 
other countries that it cannot – or will not – fit comfortably into the decision-making 
and norm-setting structures of global political bodies. Luck (1999) argues that US 
exceptionalism proved to be one of the most common obstacles to successful 
international cooperation in the 20th century. Luck (ibid: 16) finds that the 
unprecedented American power  
 
“(…) combined with deep strains of idealism and ideology, shaped by a 
singular history, and conditioned by a political system defined by the 
separation of powers and by partisan differences over foreign policy, American 
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relations with the League of Nations and the United Nations have proven 
more persistently problematic than those of any other nation (…)”.  
    
From this exceptionalist perspective, international law and organisation have been 
expected to express, embody, and extend the American dream – not to challenge or 
modify it. The US constitution and its bill of rights have since the founding of the 
United States symbolised a divine inspiration to lead the world to greater respect for 
personal freedom. Thereby, US law was not to be trumped by any international law 
to the contrary. While some states have a constitution that gives international law 
clear primacy, the United States has not. The United States generally opposes the 
making of international law and organisation that might seriously restrain the 
independent or unilateral exercise of US power (Forsythe 2002: 975, 981). Even 
among internationalists you can find an attitude that views the US as the centre of 
the political and economic universe. Some so-called triumphalists have claimed that 
American hegemony is good for the world and that a true multipolar system would 
be less benevolent and less stable (Luck 1999: 16; Kagan 1998).  
Ikenberry (2004) argues that after the Cold War, the rise of unipolarity has made 
the United States able to untie itself from the constraints of post-war obligations and 
responsibilities: “The US needs the world – partners, rules, alliances and institutions 
– less than other states do, and so it can recapture its sovereignty and freedom of 
action” (ibid: 85).   
US exceptionalism has several possible implications for the American attitude 
towards the norm of non-intervention. Because of the US opposition to restraining 
international law, we can expect that the United States will not let an international 
norm to be in its way if a certain situation demands the use of force. A United States 
with Jacksonian features would allow the use of all available means in the protection 
of US interests. Alternatively, the Wilsonian view of the US “manifest destiny” as an 
incentive to lead and improve the world could lead to a United States acting as a 
world policeman, placing itself above international law and intervening whenever it 
feels it is necessary. Nevertheless, a United States following an exceptionalist line 
would not let international norms decide when to use force.  
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Clearly, the superiority of US power represents a challenge for a multilateral 
world order. Ideally, multilateral organisations would flourish in a multipolar world 
in which power, wealth and political values were more evenly distributed. When one 
member state is considerably more powerful than the rest, it is difficult to avoid a 
reflection of this power disparity in the organisation’s decision-making processes. 
This dilemma has been a grave problem for the functionality of international 
institutions throughout the last century (Luck 1999: 24). 
In the United Nations, the dilemma has become particularly obvious in the case 
of Iraq and in the dispute over US failure to fulfil its financial commitments to the 
UN. Nevertheless, despite harsh criticism from other member states, most world 
leaders want a strong US president and a united America, according to Luck (ibid: 
26-27). Luck argues that few UN members would dispute that the United States is 
indispensable to the success of many international undertakings, given its unique 
position in the international system. Hence, we can find the same ambivalence 
towards the US among world leaders as we see in American foreign policy towards 
international organisations.  
In the American public opinion, however, multilateral approaches are preferred 
over unilateral action. Most Americans actually want the US to engage the world 
through multilateral institutions. But because of a traditional public indifference to 
foreign policy, the battlefield has been left to those with special interests. This 
explains much of why the US-UN relationship has been so full of conflicts despite an 
American majority being in favour of the world organisation (Nye 2002: 133-134). 
 
3.3.1 The US-UN relationship 
The US-UN relationship has been ambiguous yet from the beginning. In 1995, then 
United States’ UN ambassador Madeleine Albright claimed that:  
 
From the day we signed the UN Charter, Americans – Republican and Democrat – 
have viewed the United Nations not as an end in itself, but as one instrument, among 
many, for advancing US goals. 
         (quoted in The Stanley Foundation 1995: 5) 
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More than any other country, the US was responsible for the creation of the United 
Nations – the most prominent of all the organisations in the post-war world order. It 
is not very controversial to argue that US enthusiasm in the creation process was a 
key determinant for the broad support and success of the United Nation. Yet, as 
Cronin (2002: 115) points out, “(…) the US has alternately been both the UN’s most 
enthusiastic advocate and its harshest critic”.   
Even before the paralysing Cold War conflicts, the US had trouble unifying its 
position as the dominant power with the responsibilities of global leadership. As a 
treaty-based, universal organisation based on liberal principles of international 
organisation and law, the UN would commit most states to accept a set of norms that 
were consistent with American values. By institutionalising these norms within a 
legally binding treaty, the UN would help to maintain the status quo and legitimise 
the American pre-eminent role in international affairs (Cronin 2001: 116).  
During the UN’s first years, the United States was a principal defender of the law 
of the Charter. The US insisted on the Charter’s validity, and on its interpretation to 
strictly limit the tolerable uses of force (Henkin 1989: 52-53).  The UN majority was 
behind the US, which was considered to be the leading nation both intellectually and 
politically. As a result of the colonial entry in the 1960s, US influence in the General 
Assembly declined sharply during the 1960s and the 1970s (Murphy 2004: 3-4).19 
After a brief period of dominance, the US soon found that it could not control the 
organisation it had been so influential in creating (Cronin 2001: 117).  
 
3.2.2 Sharing the Council Cake 
In the planning of the United Nations, the US was enthusiastic at the thought of a 
powerful Security Council. At Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, the US delegates 
strongly supported the Security Council veto provisions (Schlesinger 2003; Rawski 
and Miller 2004: 357). In practice, the Americans soon discovered that the other great 
powers could use the veto to thwart US initiatives as well. In the Security Council, 
the United States had to share its authority with the other great powers (Cronin 2002: 
                                                   
19 During the 1960s, the number of UN members accelerated dramatically as a result of the colonial liberation. The 
so-called third world countries suddenly constituted the UN majority, a majority strongly influenced by the 
Soviet Union (Murphy 2004: 3-4).  
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118). Consequently, the world organisation provided both opportunities and 
constraints for the United States in its pursuit of global hegemony – even before the 
onset of the Cold War. Over time, the US became increasingly frustrated at its 
inability to build a UN consensus around the American vision of world order. As a 
result, the US practically abandoned the UN road to leadership for three decades 
(Cronin 2002: 118). 
During the Cold War, the bipolar stalemate practically paralysed the UN Security 
Council and thereby shattered the UN’s work for peace and security in this period 
(Mingst and Karns 2000; Murphy 2004: 183). Schlesinger (2003: 284-285) notices that 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the veto had the “paradoxical effect of turning the 
Security Council into one of the few countervailing powers to the United States”. 
Because of its unique role as the only global body to legitimise the use of armed 
force, the Council got a more central role in world affairs after 1989. The legitimacy of 
the Council forced the great powers to seek its approval before going to military 
action. Otherwise, they risked having to act outside of international law (ibid.). This 
normative “dilemma” has not least become obvious when we look at military 
intervention. As we shall see, the role of the Security Council has been of varying 
importance to the United States in the four cases considered here.  
 
3.3.3 A new world – new possibilities 
With the end of the Cold War came a revived belief in international cooperation 
(Murphy 2004: 2). A multilateral optimism spread and held promise of a well-
functioning system of cooperation, and the Security Council got the chance to 
resurrect as an important and active institution. During the 1990s, the Council 
changed its approach to conflicts and conflict resolution, and the use of the veto 
power dropped considerably (Rawski and Miller 2004: 358-360; Malone 2003: 74). 
The leadership or strong support of the United States led to Council innovation in 
several areas, including international law governing the use of force, the 
establishment of international criminal tribunals, peacekeeping, and the use of 
economic sanctions. The US was the driving force behind the intervention in the 
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Persian Gulf in 1991, the intervention in Somalia in 1992 and in Haiti in 1994 (Rawski 
and Miller 2004: 358-360). 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council faced its first challenge 
of this decade. The Council passed the test. With the US administration under 
George H. W. Bush in the forefront, the Council authorised the use of force by a US-
led coalition for the first time since the Korean War (Murphy 2004: 4). Cronin (2002) 
argues that the US took the opportunity of the Gulf crisis to reassert American 
leadership by regaining its dominant role in the UN.  
Resolution 678 on Iraq marked a high point of US-UNSC collaboration in this 
rather successful period. Nevertheless, the new optimism was soon dispelled by the 
UNSC’s disappointing lack of ability to deal with the conflicts in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Somalia and Kosovo (Murphy 2004).  
Despite the establishment of a liberal international order in the early 1990s, the 
tensions in the UN-US relationship remained. The core of these tensions was the 
dilemma of attempting to build a consensus around American leadership while 
simultaneously asserting American self-interest (Cronin 2001: 118). The cooperative 
stance soon gave way to American unilateralism and progressive marginalisation of 
the Council: “US aid to and support of Council initiatives in this period never came 
without a prize” (Rawski and Miller 2004: 362). 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sketched out some relevant features of US leadership and 
foreign policy in the 20th and 21st centuries. What becomes particularly clear,  is the 
essentiality of US exceptionalism to the research question of this thesis. This view of 
a superior America with a “manifest destiny” is a key in the understanding of US 
self-understanding and its behaviour on the international arena.  
As we shall see in chapters four and five, US exceptionalism is a stabile, 
continuing feature of US foreign policy – independent of the US administration’s 
political colour or the president’s name. Exceptionalism seems to result in an US 
attitude saying that because of the United States’ unique position, it should not let 
itself be restrained by international arrangements. Hence, exceptionalism will be a 
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prominent explanatory variable to US action in international politics. In both 
administrations considered in this thesis, exceptionalism is of great importance in the 
understanding of their attitude to the use of military force and the norm of non-
intervention.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
The Clinton Administration and the Norm 
of Non-Intervention 
 
 
We can’t prevent every conflict or stop every outrage. But 
where our interests are at stake and we can make a 
difference, we should be, and we must be, peacemakers. 
– President Bill Clinton, January 27, 2000. 
 
 
This chapter will look at the Clinton administration’s intervention policy, and will 
concentrate on the argumentation behind the military actions in Iraq in the 1990s and 
in Kosovo in 1999.20 These cases are of particular interest because of the disputed 
legitimacy of the use of force. In Iraq, the Clinton administration acted militarily both 
with and without UN mandate, and in Kosovo there was no Security Council 
authorisation of the use of force.  
On many fields, the Bill Clinton administration to a large extent represented a 
continuation of the traditional Wilsonian approach of building a world order based 
on the rule of law. However, Clinton’s opponents criticised him for failing to assert 
American primacy after the Cold War. Instead of recognising that the United States 
now had free reins, they argued, the Clinton administration ensnared the country in 
multilateral frameworks (Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 12). 
Rhetorically, the Clinton administration was committed to liberal 
internationalism. It insisted on US leadership through multilateral institutions and 
wanted to shape international order by consensus. The United States was the 
indispensable nation because of its abilities of coalition-building and organising joint 
                                                   
20 Regarding Iraq, the focus will be on Operation Desert Fox in December 1998.  
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action (Kupchan 2002: 14). Yet, Kupchan (ibid.) argues that “the record belies the 
rhetoric”. The Clinton administration was in principle committed to a multilateral 
brand of international governance, but frequently, it felt compelled to act alone. 
Early in its White House period, the Clinton administration asserted that US 
interests could be advanced through the Security Council. Like his predecessor, 
George H. W. Bush, President Clinton saw that action through the UN allowed the 
US to share the cost of international intervention with other countries (Malone 2003: 
87). However, it soon became clear that the administration would put the UNSC 
aside if it found this to be in US interest. In Kosovo, Kagan (2003: 52) notes, the 
Clinton administration learned the lesson that multilateral action, even with the best 
intentions, could not succeed without a significant element of unilateralism: “The 
Clinton administration had come into office talking about assertive multilateralism; it 
ended up talking about America as “the indispensable nation””.   
In its National Security Strategy for a New Century, launched in 1997, the Clinton 
administration underlined that it would use armed force if this was necessary, and 
that military force and the credible possibility of its use are essential to defend 
American vital interests and security: “We will do whatever it takes to defend [these 
interests], including – when necessary – using our military might unilaterally and 
decisively (The White House 1997: 12).”21 
As the Clinton record shows, this was not only rhetoric. President Clinton 
ordered the use of military force several times during his time in office, not only in 
Iraq and Kosovo, but also in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Sudan and Afghanistan. Somalia 
was the only conflict in which US soldiers were killed, leading Clinton to 
immediately withdrawing US troops.22   
This chapter starts by discussing some general features of the Clinton 
administration’s intervention policy, particularly focused on the Clinton Doctrine. 
                                                   
21 As the administration’s first strategy, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (The White 
House 1994), the National Security Strategy for a New Century was re-launched once a year . However, the basic 
principles were the same.  
22 In October 1993, 18 American soldiers were killed in Mogadishu. The killings led to a public outcry in the 
United States, and the Clinton administration immediately withdrew its troops. The incident led to the so-called 
“body-bag”-syndrome, which has created a barrier against US hard power intervention abroad. Consequently, 
any intervention had to be risk-free. This implied air power – and no land forces (Mingst and Karns 1995: 94-95; 
Matlary 2002: 216). The willingness to put boots on the ground has increased with the Bush administration’s 
extensive war on terror. 
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Then follows an analysis of the argumentation behind the Clinton administration’s 
operations in Iraq, with special focus on Operation Desert Fox, before I discuss 
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. The argumentation will be arranged into the five 
categories set out in chapter one: National security (a), international security (b), 
humanitarian concerns (c), breach with international law (d) and democratisation (e).  
I will also shortly discuss the legality versus the legitimacy in both interventions. 
Finally, I summarise the findings and give some concluding comments.  
 
4.1 The Clinton Doctrine 
Halberstam (2001) argues that Bill Clinton by instinct was interested in domestic 
policies, and that foreign policy remained distant to him. An examination of 
President Clinton’s State of the Union speeches from 1993 to 2000 shows that foreign 
policy is left far from the same attention as domestic issues. The use of force against a 
foreign enemy is just indirectly considered, and Iraq and the regime of Saddam 
Hussein is, together with North Korea, the main consideration. For example:   
 
For the foreseeable future, the United States, in concert with regional allies, 
must remain able to deter credibly and defeat large-scale, cross-border 
aggression in two distant theatres in overlapping time frames. As long as 
countries like Iraq and North Korea remain capable of threatening vital US 
interests, this requirement is only prudent 
       (The White House 1997: 16) 
 
The focus on American interest as the main priority is explicit in the Clinton 
administration’s security strategies: “Since there are always many demands for U.S. 
action, our national interests must be clear” (The White House 1997: 12). Three 
interest categories are listed. The first includes the vital interests of broad importance 
to the survival and safety of the United States. Secondly, there are situations where 
important interests are at stake without affecting US national survival, exemplified 
by the intervention in Haiti and the NATO operations in Bosnia. Interestingly, the 
third category involves humanitarian interests:  
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In the event of natural or manmade disasters or gross violations of human 
rights, our nation may act because our values demand it. Moreover, in such 
cases, the force of our example bolsters support for our leadership in the 
world. 
                  (ibid.) 
 
As this chapter will show, this humanitarian argument was frequently used by the 
Clinton administration to legitimise military action in Kosovo in 1999. The 
humanitarian aspect of Clinton’s foreign policy is definitely present, but the analysis 
indicates that the US motivation is rather strategic than idealistic or moralistic. 
Kupchan (2002: 13-14) argues that Clinton by the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo 
created confusion about the circumstances under which America would use force. In 
these interventions, Clinton stressed the humanitarian rather than the strategic 
motivation, by many viewed as hence offering a new doctrine of intervention. 
Krauthammer (1999) sees the following quote as a summary of a Clinton Doctrine:  
 
I want us to live in a world where we get along with each other, with all of our 
differences, and where we don't have to worry about seeing scenes every night 
for the next 40 years of ethnic cleansing in some part of the world. 
                   (Clinton 1999b: 13) 
 
The words were uttered on March 23, the day before the bombing of Kosovo started, 
and have a clear humanitarian basis. The president’s words are visionary, 
emphasising peace and harmony in a world of differences “where we don’t have to 
worry” – implying “as we do now”.  
Klare (1999), on the other hand, finds the following quote from a speech on 
February 26, 1999, as the most explicit expression of the Clinton Doctrine:  
 
It's easy, for example, to say that we really have no interests in who lives in this 
or that valley in Bosnia, or who owns a strip of brushland in the Horn of 
Africa, or some piece of parched earth by the Jordan River. But the true 
measure of our interests lies not in how small or distant these places are, or in 
whether we have trouble pronouncing their names. The question we must ask 
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is, what are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and 
spread? We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. 
But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a 
difference, we must be prepared to do so. And we must remember that the real 
challenge of foreign policy is to deal with problems before they harm our 
national interests. 
               (Clinton 1999e: 3) 
 
This quote is from a speech held just a month before Operation Allied Force in 
Kosovo started. Here, Clinton’s argument seems to be that no matter how far away a 
conflict is, the United States has to ask how this conflict can harm US interests and 
values. As we will see later in this chapter, this type of argumentation was frequently 
used by President Clinton to justify US action, not least why the intervention was 
important to US interest.  
For Klare, the essence of the Clinton Doctrine is that the best way to maintain 
stability in the areas that truly matter to the United States, like Europe, is to fight 
instability in other areas before it can intensify and spread – no matter how 
insignificant these areas may seem. Klare interprets the bombing of Kosovo as part of 
this larger strategic doctrine. What I see in this quote, however, is a foreshadowing of 
a type of argument that is repeating itself in US language regarding the use of force: 
To justify a military operation abroad, US national interest and security have to 
accompany the humanitarian argument.  
In particular, we should note the language resembling the Bush administration’s 
pre-emptive strategy: “(…) the real challenge of foreign policy is to deal with 
problems before23 they harm our national interests” (Clinton: ibid.).24 
The problem of defining a Clinton Doctrine based on a humanitarian aspect is the 
lack of consistence. As Kupchan (2002: 14) underlines, the Balkans did not establish a 
precedent for American military intervention. The United States abstained from 
involvement in Rwanda, East Timor, Sudan, Sierra Leone and other sites of ethnic 
and religious conflict throughout the 1990s. Kupchan quote Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright’s attempt to reinterpret the so-called Clinton Doctrine: “Some 
                                                   
23 My emphasis. 
24 The Bush Doctrine of pre-emption was announced in 2002, and will be considered in the next chapter.  
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hope, others fear, that Kosovo will be a precedent for similar interventions around 
the globe. I would caution against any such sweeping conclusions“(ibid: 13). 
A possible sum-up of the Clinton doctrine may be strategic intervention to 
combat instability – justified by humanitarian arguments. This is, for example, shown 
in the following argumentation regarding the Kosovo intervention, where Clinton is 
using the humanitarian argument strategically:  
 
I have a responsibility as President to deal with problems such as this before 
they do permanent harm to our national interest. America has a responsibility 
to stand with out allies when they are trying to save innocent lives (…). 
                      (Clinton 1999d: 5) 
 
Moreover, I think the following quote from Clinton’s State of the Union Address in 
1995 can illustrate a possible Clinton Doctrine:  
 
Our security still depends on our continued world leadership for peace and 
freedom and democracy. We still can’t be strong at home unless we’re strong 
abroad. 
       (Clinton 1995: 16)  
 
This is a phrase that repeats itself in both Clinton’s speeches (e.g. Clinton 1996; 1999b; 
1999c) and the Clinton administration’s National Security Strategies (The White 
House 1994; 1997).  
 
4.2 Iraq – the intermezzo 
Iraq has been a high priority in US foreign policy since the end of the Cold War – not 
least after the Gulf War in 1991 (e.g. Thune 2003; Kagan and Kristol 2005). Being 
continuously reminded of the Iraq intervention in 2003 and its consequences, it may 
be easy to forget that the United States has been involved militarily in Iraq since the 
Gulf War.  
The Clinton administration led an active policy on the Iraq issue, and made a 
future regime change in Iraq central in this policy. Saddam Hussein was considered a 
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serious threat both to US and international security: “As long as Saddam Hussein 
remains in power, he will continue to threaten the well-being of his people, the peace 
of the region and the security of the world” (Clinton 1999a: 2). During the Clinton 
years, the US bombed Iraqi targets on several occasions, motivated by both 
humanitarian and security arguments.  
On April 3, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 687 on Iraq. The 
resolution decided that Iraq unconditionally must accept the destruction of all its 
chemical and biological weapons and its most far-reaching ballistic missiles. Iraq 
must also agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or material usable for 
such weapons, and allow a commission of UN weapon inspectors to investigate 
Iraq’s weapon capabilities (UNSC 1991b; Da Silva 2004: 206-207). Shortly after the de 
facto cease-fire to the Gulf War, there were reports of attacks by Iraqi forces against 
Iraq’s Kurdish and Shiite populations. This caused nearly two million refugees to flee 
toward the Turkish and Iranian borders. On April 5 1991, the Security Council 
agreed on Resolution 688, which condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilian 
population. Also, the Council defined “the massive flow of refugees” as a threat to 
international peace and security in the region, and demanded Iraq to immediately 
end the repression of civilians. In addition, the Council insisted that Iraq allowed 
“immediate access by international humanitarian organisations” to those in need of 
assistance (Murphy 2004: 150-151; UNSC 1991b). The Council appealed to all 
member states and humanitarian organisations to contribute to the UN humanitarian 
relief efforts in Iraq.  
The United States, Britain and France cited this resolution to justify the 
establishment by force of refugee camps in northern Iraq. These countries also used 
Resolution 688 to justify no-fly zones in northern Iraq to protect the Kurdish 
population, and in southern Iraq to protect the Shiites. The Secretary General, on the 
other hand, suggested the need for Iraq’s consent or further Security Council action 
on the matter (Murphy ibid.).  
It is worth noticing that Resolution 688 does not invoke Chapter VII of the Charter. 
On the contrary, it recalls Article 2 (7) and reaffirms “the commitment of all Member 
States to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
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Iraq and of all States in the region”. 25 As Murphy (ibid.) points out, nothing in the 
resolution language implies an authorisation of the use of armed force to protect the 
civilian population of Iraq. 
Still, throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s the United States (together with 
other states) employed the use of armed force in and over Iraqi territory. Air strikes 
and other military action were taken when Iraq violated the cease-fire resolution, 
trespassed into Kuwait, attacked civilians or otherwise demonstrated hostile 
behaviour. In the following, I will have a look at the argumentation used to justify 
the American use of force.  
 
4.2.1. The argumentation 
In a White House statement on Iraq, the Clinton administration states that its Iraq 
policy rests on three pillars:  
 
“(…) containment of Saddam Hussein to prevent him from rebuilding his 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs or threatening his neighbours; 
humanitarian relief for the Iraqi people to minimize their suffering at the hands 
of Saddam Hussein; and supporting regime change to remove Saddam 
Hussein from power so that Iraq and its neighbours can live in peace.  
          (The White House 1999: 1) 
 
In this statement, we can observe all of the five argument categories used in this 
analysis. We see the national and international security arguments through the 
WMD-pillar. The “international law” argument may also be placed her. In pillar two 
and three, we see the humanitarian and regime change argument explicitly. As we 
will see, this “three pillars policy” is evident throughout all the material analysed in 
this sequence. 
 
 
 
                                                   
25 Article 2 (7) states that ”(N)othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII” (UN 1945).  
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a) National security 
The national security argument is frequently used to justify Operation Desert Fox. 
On the first day of the operation, President Clinton declared that the air strikes’ 
“purpose is to protect the national interest of the United States and, indeed the 
interest of people throughout the Middle East and around the world” (Clinton 1998c: 
1). Even though the president justified the attacks by an international interest 
argument, US national interest had first priority. The next day, a White House 
statement underlined that “President Clinton acted in the national security interest of 
the United States” (White House 1998: 2). Here, we see a hierarchy of security 
arguments. First, the US will protect its own national interest. Second comes regional 
security, and last, international security. 
The president himself underlined that the use of military force is never desirable, 
but sometimes it is necessary to protect US interests:   
 
Once more, the United States has proven that, although we are never eager to 
use force, when we must act in America’s vital interest, we will do so. 
                   (Clinton 1998c: 8) 
  
This quote indicates a rather pragmatic US approach to the norm of non-
intervention. The attitude seems to that the norm of non-intervention is a useful 
guide, but when the United States feel compelled to use force, it will not hesitate to 
break the norm.  
 
b) International security 
This argument had high priority in the Clinton administration’s argumentation. The 
administration considered Iraq as a serious threat to both international and regional 
security and US interests:  
 
Our policy is directed not against the people of Iraq but against the aggressive 
behaviour of the government. Until that behaviour changes, our goal is  
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containing the threat Saddam Hussein poses to Iraq’s neighbours, its people, 
the free flow of Gulf oil and broader US interests in the Middle East.  
              (The White House 1997: 34) 
 
The argument of Saddam Hussein being a threat to regional and international 
security is repeatedly put forward by the United States: “Saddam Hussein remains 
an impediment to the well-being of his people and a threat to the peace of his region 
and the security of the world” (Clinton 1998f). Here, we also see the humanitarian 
argument: Saddam Hussein is an obstacle to the well-being of his own people.  
However, as we shall see in the US language on the Iraq war of 2003 as well, the 
argument of international security is used to accompany and strengthen the 
argument of national security. Apparently, to convince the international community 
about the necessity of the attacks, the United States focuses strongly on international 
security.  
 
c) Breach with international law 
The lack of Iraqi willingness to cooperate with the UN Special Commission of 
weapons (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Bureau (IAEA) has been 
central in the conflict between Iraq and the international community. Iraq refused to 
guarantee the safety and free movement of the inspectors, and during the 1990s, 
intensified Iraqi interference resulted in the departure of the inspectors in 1998 (Da 
Silva 2004: 207; Murphy 2004: 152).  
On December 16, 1998, the four days long Operation Desert Fox was launched by 
the United States and Britain as a reaction to Iraqi refusal to allow the inspectors to 
recommence their functions. The UNSC did not authorise it, and some Council 
members uttered various degrees of disapproval. Nor did the United States and 
Britain obtain the Security Council’s authorisation for the operation, but merely 
referred to UNSC resolutions 1154 and 1205 as providing the legal basis for the 
attack. The resolutions had been passed under Chapter VII, but did not make explicit 
provision for the use of force (Gray 2002: 11; Lobel and Ratner 1999). The plan was to 
attack and destroy Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological programs, and the state’s 
military capacity to threaten its neighbours. The purpose was, as stated above, “to 
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protect the national interest of the United States and, indeed, the interest of people 
throughout the Middle East and around the world” (The White House 1998). 
The Council and the US administration warned Iraq several times that non-
compliance with Council demands would be regarded as a “material breach” of its 
obligations and lead to serious consequences (E.g. Clinton 1998b: 2; Da Silva 2004: 
208). According to the United States and Britain, the Iraqi acceptance of Resolution 
687 and its obligations, a material breach of these obligations revived the 
authorisation to use force given by Resolution 678. France, Russia and China, 
however, contended that only the Council could take the decision to resort to force 
(Da Silva: ibid.).  
In the White House statements on the air strikes, there is a clear focus on US 
leadership and decision-power in the Iraq issue – the Security Council is nearly 
overshadowed: “The United States gave Iraq the opportunity to avoid air strikes”, 
“The president decided to give Saddam one last chance (…)” (The White House 
1998). On December 16, 1998, President Clinton (1998c) stated that  
 
(i)f Saddam can cripple the weapons inspections system and get away with it, 
he would conclude that the international community, led by the United States, 
has simply lost its will”. 
 
Non-compliance with the UN weapons inspectors regime is central in the 
argumentation behind the use of force. Iraq’s breach with Security Council 
resolutions is fundamental in US language on the matter, and is constantly repeated 
by the administration. For example, in February 1998, President Clinton, warned 
Saddam Hussein that he must “give the weapons inspectors full, free unfettered 
access to all suspected sites anywhere in Iraq” (1998e: 1). Clinton also underlined that 
“there will be serious consequences” if Iraq failed to comply with the UN, and that if 
Iraq did not comply,   
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everyone would understand that then the United States and hopefully all of 
our allies would have the unilateral right to respond at a time, place and 
manner of our own choosing.  
     (1998b: 3) 
 
A White House Statement emphasises that President Clinton ordered Operation 
Desert Fox against Iraq for “its failure to comply with the United Nations Special 
Commission’s (UNSCOM) weapons inspections (…)” (White House 1998: 1).  
The president focused strongly on Saddam Hussein’s non-compliance as a main 
argument for using force against Iraq, e.g.: “The international community gave 
Saddam one last chance to cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has 
failed to seize the chance” (Clinton 1998c: 5). The president stated that Saddam must 
not be permitted to “defy the will of the international community. Without a firm 
response, he would have been emboldened to do that again and again” (Clinton 
1998d: 1). 
Also, Clinton expressed that Operation Desert Fox had the intention of putting 
pressure on Iraq: “I hope Saddam will come into cooperation with the inspections 
system now and comply with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions” (1998c: 
6). Thus, Operation Desert Fox had the function of demonstrating the consequences 
of non-compliance.  
 
d) Humanitarian concerns 
The US administration continually used humanitarian arguments about the 
operations in Iraq. Every attack aiming to destroy Iraqi military targets, was 
supported by arguments criticising Saddam Hussein for mistreating his own people 
and that the Iraqi people deserved a new, humane regime. In his first announcement 
concerning Operation Desert Fox on December 16, 1998, President Clinton 
underlined that Iraq needs a new government “that respects the rights of its people” 
(1998c: 7). Moreover, Clinton underlines that “this crisis also demonstrates, 
unfortunately, once again, that Saddam Hussein remains an impediment to the well-
being of his people (…) (Clinton 1998f: 3).  
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Clinton also emphasised the danger of Saddam Hussein attacking his own people 
with weapons of mass destruction:  
 
 
He has used such weapons before against soldiers and civilians, including his 
own people. We have no doubt that it is left unchecked that he would do so 
again. 
  (1998d: 1) 
 
By using the expression “no doubt”, Clinton here makes it clear that without 
international action, Saddam Hussein will use WMDs again. The message is that 
military means are necessary to save the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein.  
The material analysed here implies that the humanitarian aspect was not as 
outspoken and dominating as the security arguments and the international law 
arguments in Operation Desert Fox and US language on Iraq in general. The analysis 
suggests that the humanitarian arguments to a larger degree had the role of 
supporting and strengthening the other types of arguments, rather than being the top 
priority of US policy. 
 
e) Democratisation 
This argument is not very evident in the speeches and documents considering the 
Iraq question. However, regime change in Iraq was an outspoken goal in US foreign 
policy also under Clinton. In October 1998, the administration supported the Iraq 
Liberation Act, which stated that it should be US policy to support efforts to remove 
the regime of Saddam Hussein and promote democracy in Iraq. Regime change was 
also a recurrent issue in the argumentation for “the containing of Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq” (E.g. Clinton 1998a and 1998d; The White House 1999; Kagan and Kristol 2005: 
24). In a speech on November 15 1998, President Clinton claimed that the best way to 
address the Iraqi threat was through “a government in Baghdad – a new government 
– that is committed to represent and respect its people, not repress them; that is 
committed to peace in the region” (Clinton 1998f: 3). A White House statement on 
Operation Desert Fox declared that the president “will work toward the day when 
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Iraq has a government worthy of its people” (White House 1998: 2). In his speech on 
the first day of Operation Desert Fox, President Clinton himself emphasised the 
importance of regime change in Iraq:  
 
The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the 
well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world. The 
best way to end that threat once and for all is with the new Iraqi government, a 
government ready to live in peace with its neighbours, a government that 
respects the rights of his people. 
                                 (1998c: 7) 
 
As we can see, the president does in fact use both the humanitarian argument and 
the international security argument here. Clinton emphasises regime change in Iraq 
as the best solution both to give the Iraqis a better life, and to strengthen regional and 
international security.  
 
4.2.2 Legality vs. legitimacy 
Da Silva (2004: 205, 211) argues that Operation Desert Fox complicated rather than 
eased the Iraq situation. The immediate outcome of the air strikes was Iraq’s refusal 
to let UNSCOM and the IAEA return, and the decision to stop all cooperation with 
the UN except the oil-for-food program.  
The UNSC resolutions used by the US to legitimise Operation Desert Fox against 
Iraq did not explicitly authorise the use of force. Murphy (2004: 153-154) questions 
whether it is ever justifiable to rely on an implicit Security Council authorisation of 
the use of force. Murphy argues that the approach adopted by the US and Britain 
“seems incompatible with a rule of law paradigm”. The UN Charter is clear on 
barring the use of force to settle disputes, and hence, arguably, Security Council 
authorisation of the use of force must be explicit (Lobel and Ratner 1999; Murhpy 
2004). 
Thus, both the legality and the legitimacy of the Operation Desert Fox is 
questionable. What seems to be clear is that the United States acted against the will of 
the UNSC.  
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4.2.3 Summary  
The Clinton administration’s “three pillars policy” on Iraq, as described above, is 
evident throughout the argumentation analysed here. The security arguments are in 
front, but also the arguments of humanitarian concerns, breach of international law 
and democratisation are all frequently used. Yet, the material implies that the 
security arguments and the arguments of international law were the most prominent 
in the Clinton administration’s intervention policy against Iraq. 
 
4.3 Kosovo: US interest and the humanitarian argument 
From 1998, the Security Council became involved in Kosovo. The humanitarian 
crises here would mark a severe defeat to the integrity of the Security Council. The 
international community first sought a diplomatic solution, but negotiations failed. 
In 1998, the UNSC adopted two resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter 
(UNSC 1998a and b). However, it was clear that the Council would never authorise 
a military intervention in Kosovo. Both Russia and China threatened to veto any 
resolution authorizing the use of military force, leading NATO to take military 
action without seeking a Council mandate. On March 23, 1999, NATO attacked 
Kosovo in an air campaign that would last up until June 10 the same year. The 
operation was named Operation Allied Force. The right of self-defence was not 
applicable as none of the NATO member states were threatened by instability 
within Kosovo, and there was no Security Council mandate.26 However, NATO 
member states interpreted the situation such that there were sufficient 
humanitarian grounds to act (Chandler 2002: 17, Matlary 2002: 209; Murphy 2004; 
155). “NATO intervened in Kosovo to halt a humanitarian catastrophe and restore 
stability in a strategic region lying between Alliance member states” (NATO 2003).  
In the following, the US arguments behind the NATO operation in Kosovo will 
be discussed.  
 
                                                   
26 See article 5 in The North Atlantic Treaty (NATO 1949).  
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4.3.1 The argumentation 
President Clinton declared three objectives for the air strikes in Kosovo: First, to 
demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression and its support for 
peace. Second, to deter President Milosovic from continuing and escalating attacks 
on civilians by imposing a price for those attacks. Third, if necessary, to damage 
Serbia’s capacity to wage war by seriously diminishing its military capabilities 
(1999c: 1). Here, we particularly see two types of arguments: Security and 
humanitarian concerns. Also, I will place the NATO-argument in the security 
category, because NATO can be said to serve both US national security and 
international security. As the following sections will show, a combination of these 
two arguments dominated the US argumentation with regards to the Kosovo 
intervention.  
 
a) National security 
Obviously aware of the critical voices against US involvement in the Balkans, Clinton 
is eager to underline that the intervention is “important to America’s national 
interest”:  
 
Do our interests in Kosovo justify the dangers to our Armed Forces? I’ve 
thought long and hard about that question. I am convinced that the dangers of 
acting are far outweighed by the dangers of not acting – dangers to defenceless 
people and to our national interests.  
                     (Clinton 1999d: 4) 
 
Clinton (1999b: 8) underlines that military action is “morally right and in the vital 
interest of the United States”. He argues that he has “the responsibility to deal with 
problems” before they do permanent harm to US national interests, and emphasises 
the US responsibility to stand with its allies “when they are trying to save innocent 
lives and preserve peace, freedom and stability in Europe” (Clinton 1999d: 5).  
Securing a free, safe and united Europe is emphasised as being a precondition to 
US prosperity and security, and Clinton draw the historic lines back to World War I 
and II to illustrate his point. It’s necessary to secure Europe, “so that future 
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generations of Americans do not have to cross the Atlantic to fight another terrible 
war”: 
 
There is a practical reason – if we don’t do it now, we’ll have to do it later, 
more people will die, and it will cost more money. And there is a long term, 
strategic reason for the United States – our children need a stable, free Europe.  
                        (Clinton 1999b: 4)  
 
With the so-called body-bag syndrome in mind, it is also interesting to see Clinton’s 
underlining of the fact that the US “prevailed in Kosovo without losing a single 
American in combat” (Clinton 2000: 13). 
 
b) International security 
As stated above, European security is emphasised in the security argumentation 
justifying the air strikes. The international security argument, so obvious in the Iraq 
case, is not very visible here. Anyway, the regional security, also in this category, is 
very evident in the analysed material. This argument is frequently used, for example 
in Clinton’s address to the nation on March 24, 1999: “(…) key U.S. allies could be 
drawn into a wider conflict, a war we would be forced to confront later – only at far 
greater risk and greater cost” (Clinton 1999d: 5). On March 23, the first day of 
Operation Allied Force, President Clinton underlined the dangers of non-action to 
regional security: “If we don’t do something, they [Serbia] have 40.000 troops there, 
and a bigger offensive could start any moment”.   
The president is particularly emphasising the importance of protecting regional 
security as prevention against future stability. Clinton argues that one of the main 
challenges to the vision of a “peaceful, secure, united, stable Europe” is “the 
challenge of ending instability in the Balkans so that these bitter ethnic problems in 
Europe are resolved by the force of argument, not the force of arms (...)” (Clinton 
1999d: 5).  
Through repeated arguments of this type, Clinton puts much effort into 
demonstrating that European instability is dangerous for US allies, implying that the 
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US itself runs a risk by not acting. This is discussed in the part on national security 
above.  
 
c) Breach with international law 
US ambassador Burleigh, in his March 24 statement to the Security Council, did not 
only focus on the need “to respond to Belgrade’s brutal persecution of Kosovar 
Albanians”, but also on the necessity to act against Serbia’s violations of international 
law and refusal to resolve the issue peacefully. Burleigh, as other US officials 
occasionally did, cited the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s violation of Resolutions 
1199 and 1203, which invoked Chapter VII in the UN Charter, but did not explicitly 
authorize the use of force (UNSC 1998a; 1998b; Burleigh 1999a; 1999b). E.g.: “Security 
Council resolutions 1199 and 1203 recognized that the situation in Kosovo constitutes 
a threat to peace and security in the region and invoked Chapter VII of the Charter” 
(Burleigh 1999a:1)). However, Burleigh stated that “NATO’s actions are completely 
justified” (1999b: 2). 
President Clinton also justifies the bombing by pointing at Serbian unwillingness 
to accept a diplomatic solution to the conflict: “In short, if President Milosevic will 
not make peace, we will limit his ability to make war” (Clinton 1999d).27 This has its 
parallel in the argumentation related to the Clinton administration’s air strikes 
against Iraq, where limitation of Saddam Hussein’s military capabilities was the 
central element. Another Iraq parallel here is Clinton’s strong emphasis on 
Milosevic’s lack of cooperation: “He is still denying his responsibility for the crisis, 
defying the international community, and destroying the lives of more people” 
(Clinton 1999b: 6). The language here clearly resembles US descriptions of Saddam 
Hussein, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Similar to Saddam Hussein, Milosevic is 
characterised by non-compliance with the international community and inhuman 
treatment of his own people.  
 
 
 
                                                   
27 After several weeks of diplomatic action in March 1999, the Kosovar delegation signed a draft agreement for 
peace. The Serbian delegation refused to accept the agreement (Heinbecker 2004: 541). 
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d) Humanitarian concerns 
The NATO operation against Serbia/Former Republic of Yugoslavia over the Kosovo 
crises was widely greeted as the first international military intervention against a 
sovereign state for solely human rights purposes. The war was fought for values, not 
territory. For many advocates of human rights, the Kosovo war marked the 
beginning of the new era of human rights enforcement (Chandler 2002: 9, 15).  
On March 24, US ambassador to the UN, Peter Burleigh, informed the Security 
Council of the bombings. The humanitarian element was deeply stressed, e.g.: “We 
believe that action by NATO is justified and necessary to stop the violence and 
prevent an even greater humanitarian disaster”. The UN ambassador underlined that 
the Serbian actions in Kosovo could not be dismissed as an internal matter, and that 
it was imperative that the international community acted quickly (Burleigh 1999a). 
Two days later, responding to a resolution draft condemning the NATO operation, 
Burleigh defined the Serbian actions in Kosovo as “a humanitarian catastrophe” 
(1999b).   
In the National security strategy of 1994, the Clinton administration pointed at 
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, admitting that the “war does not pose an 
immediate threat to our security or warrant unilateral US involvement” (The White 
House 1994: 21). However, a stabile and democratic Europe, stopping genocide and 
securing NATO’s role were by the government seen as compelling reasons for 
involvement in the Balkans. This attitude was also evident in relation to the military 
operation in Kosovo in 1999. The US involvement in Kosovo was not motivated by 
calculation of a narrow national interest, and certainly, the domestic opposition used 
this argument for what it was worth. The Clinton administration justified the 
intervention by moral interest in stopping genocide and ethnic cleansing, but both 
American politicians and realist theorists refused to see any national interest at stake 
in the Balkans (e.g. Kagan 2003: 50; e.g. Ellison and White 1999). 
President Clinton’s argumentation on Kosovo is clearly based on humanitarian 
concerns, and he underlines the importance of acting firmly and quickly to prevent 
greater catastrophe. “The lessons learned in Bosnia” is repeatedly emphasised, and 
the president points at the tragic results of a world community reacting too slowly: 
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“We learned that in the Balkans, inaction in the face of brutality simply invites more 
brutality” (Clinton 1999d: 3). The need of acting at this given moment is also stressed 
by the president: “If we don’t do anything after all the to-and-fro that’s been said 
here, it will be interpreted by Mr. Milosevic as a license to continue to kill” (Clinton 
1999b: 7).  
On the first day of Operation Allied Force, Clinton stated that the dangers of 
acting were clearly outweighed by the risk of failing to act: 
  
(…) the risks that many more innocent people will die or be driven from their 
homes by the tens of thousands; the risks that the conflict will involve and 
destabilize neighbouring nations. 
                                                                (1999c: 2)  
 
The president here put national worries of military risk aside, focusing instead on 
humanitarian concerns and European security.28 However, Clinton later the same 
day underlined that “the dangers of acting are far outweighed by the dangers of not 
acting – dangers to defenseless people and to our national interest” (1999d), hence 
pointing at the air strikes as important also for the United States alone.   
 
e) Democratisation 
Regime change is not a very outspoken goal of the operation in Kosovo. However, I 
observe that Clinton characterises the turmoil in the Balkans as one of three big 
obstacles to an “undivided, democratic, free Europe” (1999b: 4).29 In his State of the 
Union Address of 1999, Clinton underlines the importance of giving “the people of 
Kosovo the self-government they deserve” (1999f: 12). This is not the usual regime 
change argument, but can be placed in this category because of its political meaning: 
The existing situation of Kosovo must change considering how it is ruled. Clinton is 
very harsh in his criticism against President Milosevic, pointing at his defiance of 
responsibility and the international community (1999b: 6). Yet, the argument of 
democratisation/regime change is not explicit in the Kosovo crisis.  
                                                   
28 Military risk is here first and foremost the fear of American soldiers being sent home in body-bags.  
29 The other two obstacles pointed at are the Russian economy and the Greece-Turkey conflict (Clinton 1999b: 4).  
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4.3.2 Legality vs. legitimacy 
There has been a fierce debate over the legality and morality of US and NATO 
actions in Kosovo. Murphy (2004: 154) finds that NATO’s (first and foremost; the 
US’) use of force in Kosovo allegedly “strained the UN Charter’s rule of law 
paradigm to the breaking point”. Also, Rawski and Miller see the Kosovo operation 
as a severe blow to the Security Council:  
 
There could be no greater blow to the Council’s political standing. NATO, and 
the United States in particular, publicly humiliated the Council, demonstrating 
that they could and would organize a “coalition of the willing” to engage in a 
large-scale, coordinated military action without Council approval. 
                (Rawski and Miller 2004: 362) 
 
According to Rawski and Miller, an even more humiliating fact was that the rhetoric 
used to justify the Kosovo bombings was the same language of humanitarian 
intervention earlier developed by the Council. This made the Security Council seem 
like an institution “incapable of living up to its own standards” (ibid).  
Interestingly, in his speeches about the Kosovo operation, President Clinton 
avoids any mentioning of the Security Council; thus, he leapfrogs over the dilemma 
of acting without Council authorisation (E.g. Clinton 1999c; 1999d).  
Murphy (ibid: 156-161) considers possible justifications of the intervention in 
Kosovo. Firstly, it is the two generally accepted exceptions of Article 2 (4) in the UN 
Charter, namely actions taken in individual or collective self-defence or actions 
authorised by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the Charter. There is little evidence 
that Serbia’s military action within Kosovo against the Kosovo Liberation Army 
qualified as an “armed attack against a member of the United Nations” and as such 
made the intervention an act of collective self-defence.30 Considering Security 
Council authorisation, some have argued that resolutions adopted by the UNSC 
constituted an authorisation of NATO’s actions. None of the resolutions adopted 
before the bombing provided a mandate for the use force. Hence, this brings us back 
                                                   
30 Article 51 of the UN Charter emphasises the right of individual or collective self-defence against an armed 
attack (UN 1945).  
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to Murphy’s discussion of implicit versus explicit authorisation of the use of force.31 
The Charter is clear as a bell at this point: Only the Security Council can give such 
authorisation, and considering the Charter’s explicit prohibition of the use of force, it 
is problematic to argue in favour of implicit authorisation. Michael Glennon points 
out that “[i]n the past, the Security Council has left no doubt concerning its intent 
whether use of force was authorised. In Korea, the Gulf War, and Bosnia, it adopted 
resolutions that made clear that states were allowed to use force” (quoted in Murphy 
2004: 157-158).  
In any case, three days after the bombing began, China and Russia voted in 
favour of a draft resolution that would have condemned the NATO bombing as a 
violation of the UN Charter.32 Considering the fact that UNSC authorisation of the 
use of force must have support by all five permanent members, this makes it even 
more problematic to claim that the UNSC implicitly authorised the use of armed 
force in Kosovo.33 However, Heinbecker (2004: 542) argues that the defeat of the 
resolution draft was a major moral victory for the proponents of military action, 
because it left no doubt where the sympathies of the majority of the Council lay.  
Further, Murphy points at the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as a possible 
justification of Operation Allied Force. Supporters of the doctrine argue that a proper 
interpretation of the language of Article 2 [4] of the UN Charter permits the use of 
force for humanitarian reasons.34 In the case of Kosovo, Murphy questions whether 
the NATO bombing really qualified as an exercise of this doctrine.35  
In the wake of the Kosovo debate, some have argued that international law 
should be revised so to explicitly recognise the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention. Glennon (1999: 2) asserts that 
 
                                                   
31 As discussed under part 4.2.2 of this chapter. 
32 The resolution draft was not adopted, because only China, Russia and Namibia voted in favour. This non-
action by the Security Council might be interpreted as an indirect authorisation of the bombing, but considering 
the fact that two of the veto powers voted in favour of a condemnation, this argumentation is deeply problematic 
(Murphy 2004: 157). The resolution draft provoked the Americans considerably, and UN ambassador Burleigh 
argued before the Council that NATO’s actions were “completely justified”: “(T)his resolution should be 
defeated. It can only encourage President Milosevic to continue or even intensify military repression of the 
civilian population of Kosovo” (Burleigh 1999b). 
33 The five permanent members of the UNSC is the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia.  
34 See chapter two for further discussion of humanitarian intervention.  
35 See Murphy (2004: 159-161) for a more comprehensive discussion of this question. 
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[…] events since the end of the Cold War starkly show that the anti-
interventionist regime has fallen out of sync with modern notions of justice. 
The crisis in Kosovo illustrates this disjunction and America’s new willingness 
to do what it thinks right – international law notwithstanding.  
 
In 2000, the UN’s Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded that 
the intervention was “legitimate, but not legal” (quoted in Chandler 2002: 139).  
 
4.3.3 Summary 
Compared to Iraq, the national security interests in Kosovo were hard to find for 
many Americans. This is obvious in the Clinton administration’s argumentation for 
the use of force. As we have seen, the humanitarian aspect is emphasised to a large 
extent, but the administration is eager to underline the security interests involved. As 
the examples put forward here have shown, the president never used the 
humanitarian argument without focusing on why the intervention was relevant and 
important for US national interest.  
  
4.4 Conclusion 
The Clinton administration’s military operations in Iraq and Kosovo differ on many 
points – and so does the argumentation used to justify the interventions. Regarding 
Iraq, the main arguments were breach with international law and national and 
international security concerns. In Kosovo, the humanitarian argument dominated 
the administration’s language. Still, the argument of national security had the 
function of convincing US politicians and public that this American engagement in 
Kosovo is necessary.  
In the Clinton administration’s National Security Strategy of 1994, national 
interest is emphasised as the most compelling reason for the use of force (The White 
House 1994: 5).  To a large extent, this supports the findings of this analysis. National 
interest/security arguments dominate in both cases. Truly, in Kosovo, the 
humanitarian argument became extremely important. But despite this humanitarian 
aspect, the administration had to accompany this argument with an explanation of 
why military involvement in Kosovo was essential to US national security.  
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Moreover, the analysis of the Clinton administration suggests a pragmatic 
attitude to the norm of non-intervention.  The norm is a useful guide, but when the 
United States feel compelled to use force, it will not hesitate to break it.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
The Bush Administration and the Norm of 
Non-Intervention 
 
 
And, you know, I’ve never felt we needed a 
resolution; 1441 speaks very clearly. 
− President George W. Bush,  
          (February 7 2003 (2003b) 
       
 
This chapter will examine the Bush administration’s policy concerning the use of 
force after 9/11, and analyse the argumentation behind two US-led interventions: 
Afghanistan and Iraq. As the cases analysed in the previous chapter, these cases are 
interesting because of the disputed legitimacy of the use of force. In Afghanistan, the 
United States declared its right of self-defence. However, the definition of the enemy 
as a terrorist network challenged traditional, state-centric international law. In Iraq, 
the United States intervened without UN mandate and to wide international 
criticism.  
During his election campaign, foreign policy was not first on George W. Bush’s 
agenda, and he was criticised and ridiculed for being ignorant about the world. Some 
commentators even accused him for drifting towards isolationism (e.g. Vulliamy 
2000; Evans 2000). In the second Gore-Bush debate during the presidential election 
campaign at Wake Forest University in 2000, Bush expressed deep concerns about US 
international engagement:  
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(…) we can’t be all things to all people in the world. I am worried about over-
committing our military around the world. I want to be judicious in its use.  
I don’t think nation-building missions are worthwhile.  
                                                                (Bush 2000, quoted on Issues 2000).36 
 
Nor were foreign policy issues of much concern in the Bush administration’s first 
months in office. In the summer of 2001, the president stated that he had “a certain 
feeling” that the US was too closely tied into multilateral alliances and international 
organisations. He also felt that the Clinton administration had intervened too 
indiscriminately in countries around the world, using soldiers for inappropriate 
humanitarian tasks and nation building (Ash: 2004: 104-105). What Ash (ibid.) 
defines as assertive unilateralism was further underlined when the Bush 
administration in its early stages walked away from several proposed or existing 
international agreements.   
Pika and Maltese (2004: 165) argue that after 9/11, the Bush administration by 
word and by deed has asserted US primacy in the world through a redefinition of 
national strategy and its aggressive use of force – particularly in Iraq where all major 
powers except Britain opposed military action.  
The argumentation analysed in the following sections will be organised by the 
same set of categories as in the previous chapter: National security (a), international 
security (b), humanitarian concerns (c), breach with international law, (d) and 
democratisation (e). The analysis starts with a discussion of some general 
observations of the Bush administration’s foreign policy, with an overarching focus 
on the Bush Doctrine and the use of force. Further, the argumentation behind the 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq will be investigated. As in chapter four, I will 
also shortly discuss the legality versus the legitimacy in both interventions. 
Finally, I summarise the findings and give some concluding remarks.  
 
                                                   
36 The president soon had to change his reluctance to use troops for nation-building. The case of Afghanistan 
forced the president and his administration to ease off on this point. It would be impossible to leave 
Afghanistan in a vacuum after the military operation. The Bush administration even declared that it would go 
further than the Clinton administration in its pursuit of nation-building in the cause of aiding the Afghan 
people (Woodward 2002: 192; Chandler 2002: 16-17).  
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5.1 The Bush Doctrine 
Several researchers have claimed that the Bush administration has revolutionised US 
foreign policy (E.g. Daalder and Lindsay 2003; A. Schlesinger 2005; Melby 2004). 
Daalder and Lindsay (2003:2) assert that this has not been a revolution in America’s 
goals abroad, but rather in how to achieve them. President Bush “relied on the 
unilateral exercise of American power rather than on international law and 
institutions to get his way”. Instead of following the traditional track of deterrence 
and containment, the administration soon introduced the proactive doctrine of pre-
emption. 
In September 2002, the Bush administration unveiled its new national security 
strategy. Two points particularly attracted attention, not least among Europeans: The 
aspiration to put American military power “beyond challenge” and the endorsement 
of “pre-emptive actions” against threats from terrorists and rogue states: “We cannot 
let our enemies strike first” (The White House 2002: 19, 32; Ash 2004: 109). Even 
though the Clinton administration had opened up for pre-emption in the fight 
against terrorism (e.g. The White House 1997), it “took the combination of the 9/11 
shock and this particular administration to make pre-emption a central plank of 
national security strategy” (Ash: ibid).  
The strategy had already been foreshadowed in Bush’s speech at West Point June 
1, 2002 (Bush 2002c):  
 
We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst 
threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to 
safety is the path of action. And this nation will act. 
 
The pre-emptive strategy is repeated in the Bush administration’s new National 
Security Strategy, released on March 16, 2006:  
 
“To forestall or prevent [such] hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States 
will, if necessary, act pre-emptively in exercising our inherent right of self-
defence”. 
           (The White House 2006: 18) 
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The essence of this strategy is military: The US will strike a potential enemy, 
unilaterally if necessary, before the enemy has a chance to strike the US. With this 
new doctrine, war becomes a matter of presidential choice, not a matter of last resort: 
“Mr. Bush replaced a policy aimed at peace through the prevention of war by a 
policy aimed at peace through preventive war” (A. Schelsinger 2005: 21).37 
As we shall see, this rhetoric of pre-emption characterised US language to a large 
extent in both the Afghanistan and the Iraqi interventions. The primary US argument 
in both interventions was the defence against an imminent, or at least, potential, 
threat to US national security. 
  
5.2 Launching the war against terrorism: Afghanistan 
On September 11, 2001, the terror attacks against the United States sent shock waves 
through both the American and the international community. Already the same 
evening, President Bush promised his fellow citizens a massive effort to find those 
behind “these evil attacks”, and underlined that “(…) We will make no distinction 
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor38 them” 
(Bush 2001a).39 This last quote deserves some attention. Considering the events in the 
following weeks, this non-distinction between terrorists and harbour states clearly 
was of great importance to the Bush administration. The 9/11-attacks were 
performed by unidentified terrorist, not state actors. This had implications for US 
retaliation. Article 51 in the UN Charter declares a member state’s right of inherent 
self-defence, but what happens when the attacker can’t be identified and defined by 
state borders? Such considerations are likely explanations of the explicit emphasis on 
the harbour states in the post-9/11 argumentation. Vice president Dick Cheney 
supposedly thought that fighting terrorism inevitably meant targeting harbour 
states. The states were “easier targets than the shadowy terrorists” (Woodward 2002: 
48).  This can be seen is an example of how the traditional, state-centric view still 
                                                   
37 See definition of these two concepts under footnote 16. 
38 Reportedly, it was President Bush himself who wanted the use of the word “harbour”. Initially, Bush’s chief 
speechwriter, Michael Gerson, had written that the United States would make no distinction between those who 
planned the acts and those who tolerated or encouraged the terrorists. But the president found this phrase too 
vague. Hence, the final statement became an “incredibly broad commitment to go after terrorists and those who 
sponsor and protect terrorists, rather than just a proposal for a targeted retaliatory strike” (Woodward 2002: 30). 
39 This was repeated in e.g. the US National Security of 2002 (The White House 2002: 5): “We will make no 
distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them”. 
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dominates the political discourse, and how the new, less concrete actors challenge 
and complicates the way states meet threats. Interestingly, the UN Security Council 
did as early as 1998 insist firmly on state responsibility for stopping terrorist 
activities on their own territories (UN 1998c). However, this was not a license for 
international military action against so-called harbour states (Roberts 2004: 137). 
The president’s message to the world was loud and clear: “Every nation, in every 
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists” (Bush 2001c). The international reaction to the attacks was immediate and 
almost universally one of support for the United States. As early as September 12, the 
UNSC adopted Resolution 1368, which condemned the attacks, defined them as a 
threat to international peace and security and recognised the “inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence (UNSC 2001a). Hence, this resolution pointed at 
both of the exceptions from the norm of non-intervention: Self-defence and threats 
against international peace and security. Two weeks later, on September 28, the 
Council passed Resolution 1373. This resolution again cited the right of self-defence, 
and specified steps to fight terrorism, including denying safe haven to terrorist 
(UNSC 2001b).  
It is worth noticing that in neither of these resolutions, nor in the later resolutions 
on the matter, did the UNSC explicitly authorise the use of force. Nevertheless, the 
Council repeatedly referred to the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence both before and during the attack on Afghanistan. When the combat 
operations began, no effort was made to condemn the use of force. Hence, the 
Council lent a considerable amount of support to the legality of the military 
operation in Afghanistan under Article 51 of the UN Charter (Murphy 2004: 167).  
Also, September 11 opened up for NATO’s first invocation ever of Article 5 in the 
North Atlantic Treaty, which defines an attack on one member state as an attack on 
all the member states and provides for collective self-defence in such a situation. 
NATO’s offer to help was politely recognized but not taken up by the United States. 
Afghanistan never became a NATO war (Ash 2004: 107; NATO 1949).  
The United States soon verified evidence linking the 9/11 attacks to the terrorist 
group Al Qaeda, based in Afghanistan and led by Osama bin Laden. E.g.: “The 
Chapter five                The Bush administration  
 72
evidence we have gathered all point to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist 
organizations known as al Qaeda” (Bush 2001c: 2). After the Taliban regime of 
Afghanistan refused to yield to US demands to turn over the leaders of Al Qaeda, the 
United States took action. On October 7, the United States and Britain attacked 
Taliban and Al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom was a fact 
(Murphy: ibid.; Bush 2001c; Bush 2001d). 
 
5.2.1 The argumentation  
On October 7, the United States’ UN ambassador John Negroponte informed the 
Security Council about the US response to the terrorist attacks:  
 
In response to these attacks, and in accordance with the inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defence, United States armed forces have 
initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United 
States. These actions include measures against Al Qaeda terrorist training 
camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.  
       (Negroponte 2001) 
 
This quote to a large extent sums up the main US argument behind attacking 
Afghanistan: To respond and to prevent. In the following, we will see that this kind 
of argumentation was frequently repeated in the process leading towards the 
intervention in Afghanistan.  
 
a) National security 
Arguments about US national security dominate the Bush administration’s 
communication after the 9/11 attacks. The material analysed here leaves no doubt 
about the fact that protection of national security and demonstrating the 
consequences of attacking US national security were the main rationale behind the 
attack on Afghanistan.  
On September 18, a week after the terror attacks on New York and Washington, 
Bush signed Senate Joint Resolution 23, which authorised the use of military force: 
“It is (…) necessary and appropriate that the United States exercises its right to 
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defend itself and protect United States citizens both at home and abroad” (Bush 
2001b). Here, we see the declaration of the right of self-defence. To protect US 
national security, Bush underlines that the use of force is both “necessary and 
appropriate”. 
The president also emphasises how the terrorist attacks violated national security: 
“Our nation has been put on notice. We are not immune from attack. We will take 
defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans” (Bush 2001c: 3). These 
quotes are important in the understanding of the United States’ massive reaction 
after 9/11. The terror attacks were the first time in 140 years that the American civil 
population was physically stricken with actions of war. Before 9/11, most Americans 
had the perception of living in an invulnerable country. The terror attacks were a 
terrible violation of the Americans view of their own national security (e.g. Melby 
2004: 93-94). 
The president leaves no doubt about that those violating US national security 
would have to pay a high price:  
 
Those who plan, authorize, commit, or aid terrorist attacks against the United 
States and its interests – including those who harbor terrorists – threaten the 
national security of the United States.  
               (Bush 2001b)  
 
The same type of argumentation is used on the first day of Operation Enduring 
Freedom. President Bush (2001d) told the nation that the attacks were a part of the 
US campaign against terrorism, “designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a 
terrorist base of operations and to attack the military capability of the Taliban 
regime”. In these two quotes we again see the explicit non-distinction between 
terrorists and harbour states. This type of language is a main feature of the 
argumentation, indicating how important this message was to the administration – 
as discussed under 5.2: In the protection of US national security and the war against 
terrorism, terrorists and harbour states will be treated in the same way.  
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b) International security  
This international security argument is also much used, not least to support the 
argument of national security. Attacking Afghanistan and the source of the 9/11 
terrorism is a defence of freedom and security all over the world:  
 
(…) there can be no peace in a world of sudden terror. In the face of today’s 
new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it. 
        (Bush 2001d) 
 
The president emphasises that the purpose of the Afghanistan operation is not only 
to defend US “precious freedom”, but also the freedom of people all over the world 
to “raise their children free from fear” (Bush 2001d). Hence, we see a justification of 
the attacks meant to appeal far across US borders: The US is not only fighting for 
Americans’ security; it is fighting for the security of the whole world. Bush also 
transfers the national security argument to the argument of international security: 
“This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s 
freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight” (Bush 2001c: 3). Here, 
we see that Bush raises the fight up to a more overarching level: This fight is about 
the survival of civilisation. The argument may be interpreted as a reference to the 
civilisation the United States is so eager to promote, namely the Western type, built 
on liberal values and democracy. 
 
c) Humanitarian concerns 
In his address to the nation on October 7, Bush underlined that the military operation 
against Taliban and Al Qaeda would be supported by humanitarian aid to the 
“oppressed people of Afghanistan”: “As we strike military targets, we’ll also drop 
food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and 
children of Afghanistan” (2001d: 1).  
Allegedly, for President Bush humanitarian aid was fundamental to what he saw 
as the moral mission of the United States. However, for others in the administration, 
the humanitarian arguments were at best secondary. Secretary of Defence, Donald 
Rumsfeld, viewed the idea of boots on the ground to conduct humanitarian operations 
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in Afghanistan as a means to “mute some criticism of our operations” (Woodward 
2002: 124).   
The US response in Afghanistan resembles interventions in the 1970s, of which 
self-defence and regime change were immediate justifications – but with 
humanitarian benefits as important by-products.40 According to Weiss (2004: 41-42), 
the US intervention in Afghanistan is a combination of the 1970s and the 1990s. The 
casus belli – the occasion for war - in this operation was an attack on American soil, 
but a humanitarian rationale accompanied defence of US territory. 
 
d) Breach with international law 
This argument is practically non-existing in the argumentation behind Operation 
Enduring Freedom. The closest we come in the material analysed here, is the US 
argumentation of Taliban’s refusal to turn over the leaders of al-Qaeda to the United 
States. As early as September 20, President Bush delivered the following message to 
the Taliban: (...) the United States of America makes the following demands on the 
Taliban. Deliver to the United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaeda who hide 
in your land. (Bush 2001c: 2). Included in this argumentation is the assertion that the 
Taliban regime is harbouring terrorists. For example:  
 
The attacks on 11 September 2001 and the ongoing threat to the United States 
and its nationals posed by the Al-Qaeda organization have been made possible 
by the decision of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it 
controls to be used by this organization as a base of operation. Despite every 
effort by the United States and the international community, the Taliban 
regime has refused to change its policy.  
                (Negroponte 2001) 
 
As we see, Negroponte by this argument gives a certain responsibility for the 
terrorist attacks to the Taliban regime. This can be seen as an indirect reference to UN 
resolution 1189, which insists on state responsibility for stopping terrorist activities 
                                                   
40 Weiss (2004: 41) points at the interventions undertaken by India in East Pakistan, Tanzania in Uganda and 
Vietnam in Kampuchea. All of these were “unilateral efforts geared to overthrow menacing and destabilizing 
regimes in contiguous countries”, and all where justified as self-defense. The Security Council approved none of 
the interventions.  
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on their own territories (UNSC 1998c). Interestingly, Negroponte avoids referring to 
this resolution, hence not leaning on international law to strengthen US 
argumentation.  
US exceptionalism is one possible explanation for the non-existence of 
international law in the US argumentation. The United States tends to place itself 
above international law and organisation and make decision outside international 
institutions. The Afghanistan intervention was a result of a declaration of self-
defence, and truly, the UNSC defined the terror attacks as a threat to international 
peace and security and recognised the “inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence (UNSC 2001a). However, the fact that the United States avoided referring to 
the existing UNSC resolution might express that the United States actually didn’t see 
the need of such references. In light of Finnemore’s argument of the need of 
multilateral intervention, as discussed in chapter three, this avoidance of multilateral 
references is interesting.   
 
e) Democratisation 
The democratisation argument was not very outspoken in US language regarding the 
intervention in Afghanistan. This is interesting, considering the fact that the Taliban 
regime was not democratic and therefore shared some common features Iraq, which 
for years had been criticised for its lack of democracy. One interpretation of this is, of 
course, the US need to underline the security rational for attacking Afghanistan. 
Seemingly, the United States didn’t see the democratisation argument as a necessary 
justification – the grounds were strong enough all ready.    
However, as was the case with the Clinton administration, the Bush 
administration’s foreign policy reveals a strong focus on US leadership and the US 
special responsibility to make a better world. “Because of American leadership and 
resolve, the world is changing for the better” (Bush 2004: 3). A quote from US 
National Security Strategy of 2002 (The White House 2002: 1) clearly illustrates this 
attitude:  
 
The United States possesses unprecedented – and unequalled – strength and 
influence in the world. Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the 
Chapter five                The Bush administration  
 77
value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, 
obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to 
promote a balance of power that favors freedom.  
 
The spread of democracy, peace and liberal values is seen as an important part of this 
leadership. The promotion of democracy is emphasised as the “most effective long-
term measure for conflict prevention and resolution” (The White House 2006:15). In 
the National Security Strategy of 2006, the concept of democracy is frequently 
repeated, as in the following quote:  
 
To protect our Nation and our values, the United States seeks to extend 
freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and 
to promote effective democracy (ibid: 3).  
 
Donald Rumsfeld argued that the military action in Afghanistan was in line with the 
interventions in Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo “for the 
purpose of “denying hostile regimes the opportunity to oppress their own people 
and other people” (quoted in Chandler 2002: 1). Here, we see tracks of both the 
democratisation and the humanitarian arguments.  
 
5.2.2 Legality vs. legitimacy 
The Bush administration was initially dismissive of the UN and constraining 
international organisation in general. But with the events of September 11, 
Washington had to face that the UN was made relevant once again.  
Nevertheless, there was little evidence that the international struggle against 
terrorism would bring a more multilateral attitude to the White House (Tucker and 
Hendrickson 2004). Even though the US welcomed Security Council resolutions 
condemning the 9/11-attacks, Washington worked to preclude any attempt to 
constrain its margin for military and political manoeuvre. Any UN language that 
might constrain its ability to strike back at terrorists or so called harbour states was 
contained (Malone 2003). “The mission should define the coalition, not the other way 
around” (Woodward 2002: 48).  
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In spite of the Bush Doctrine and the new war on terror, which could certainly 
need multilateral support, Washington did not embrace the UN unlimitedly. The 
Bush administration took on the same attitude as its preceding two administrations; 
uneasiness about the UN’s enhanced role in the security field (Malone 2003). “For 
some, it was much to be preferred if the UN was not the forum of first resort when 
US interests dictated the need to deal with a breach of security” (ibid: 83). 
Murphy (2004: 168) notes that “unlike their use of force in Iraq after the cease-fire, 
neither the United States nor the United Kingdom has claimed an explicit or implicit 
authorisation of their use of force in Afghanistan by the Security Council”. They have 
based their justification of the attacks on the principle of self-defence, and hence 
leaning on Article 51 of the UN Charter. According to Murphy, the military 
operation in Afghanistan appears to be on solid, legal ground. Even though the 
intervention is a violation of the non-intervention norm, it invokes Article 51 and 
hence qualifies as an exception from Article 2 [4]. Chandler (2002: 138) does not share 
this position. He asserts that Article 51 is only available in response to the actions of 
states, and that the legal justification for the US-led attack on Afghanistan is unclear. 
He quotes the international lawyer Francis Boyle, who argues that “retaliation is 
never self-defence”.  
However, in the light of the Bush administration’s words and actions after 9/11, 
there is much evidence that the US would have attacked Afghanistan – with or 
without international support.  
 
5.2.3 Summary 
The Bush administration was very clear in its message throughout the Afghanistan 
operation: Those attacking and threatening the United States will have to pay for it. 
Even though the argumentation was supported by, in particular, arguments of 
international security and humanitarian concerns, the national security arguments 
were the basis for military action. The US reaction on the 9/11 attacks illustrates that 
in case of an attack on US soil, self-defence and retaliatory action will put the norm of 
non-intervention aside.  
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5.3 Fighting Saddam – and European reluctance: Iraq 
In his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, President Bush launched the 
now well-known concept of the axis of evil, including Iraq, Iran and North Korea: 
“States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to 
threaten the peace of the world” (Bush 2002a: 4). The world would soon see that the 
Bush administration was serious in its intentions to fight its outspoken enemies. 
Reportedly, on September 15, four days after the terror attacks, Deputy Secretary of 
State Paul Wolfowitz advocated attacking Iraq before Afghanistan – even though 
there was no evidence that Saddam was involved in the attacks and Osama bin 
Laden was known to be in Afghanistan. As we know, Afghanistan was hit first. 
However, on November 21 President Bush ordered military planners to develop 
concrete plans for an invasion of Iraq (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006: 16). 
On March 17, 2003, a US-led “coalition of the willing” attacked Iraq. The attack 
was the culmination of a process containing of clashes of great powers, a divided 
Security Council and widespread international opposition. In the following, I will 
take a closer look at the Bush administration’s justifications of the Iraq war. 
 
5.3.1 The road towards war 
In the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, several approaches and means was used to 
resolve the Iraqi question (see chapter four). However, the situation changed 
dramatically in early 2002, when the Bush administration explicitly put regime 
change in Iraq at the top of its foreign policy agenda. The matter had for long been an 
important element in US policy, but with September 11 came a different perception 
of how to deal with such threats as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(Da Silva 2004: 215).   
The case of Iraq developed to be an utterly infected issue in the UN during late 2002 and 
early 2003. The Bush administration’s intentions to intervene in Iraq became 
increasingly more open – and the international dispute on the matter equivalently 
more intense. On a press conference on February 7, President Bush got the question 
of what would happen if the Security Council didn’t “go along” with the US. The 
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president’s answer could not be misinterpreted: “I have said that if Saddam Hussein 
does not disarm, we will lead a coalition to disarm him. And I mean it” (Bush 2003b).  
The intense and harsh debate on the matter culminated in March 2003, when the 
United States and Britain failed to secure Security Council support for a so-called 
second resolution on Iraq. Ultimately, the two allies decided to act on their own. 
Without Council approval and despite facing deep criticism from international 
lawyers and several UN members, US-led forces intervened militarily in Iraq March 
17, 2003 (Roberts 2004: 139-140).  
Military action was taken despite the reported facts from the UN and IAEA 
inspectors about more active Iraqi cooperation, progress in the disarmament process 
and that additional time was needed to complete it. Nevertheless, the US and Britain 
decided that using force was the only means to overcome the Iraqi situation. (Da 
Silva 2004: 217; Murphy 2004). Even though President Bush (2003c) emphasised that 
more than 35 countries were giving “crucial support” to Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
the international opposition was massive.  
 
5.3.2 The argumentation 
Before and during the Iraq intervention, the US continuously warned against the 
“brutal dictator” with ties to terrorism, and argued that Iraq had “something to hide” 
and was failing to comply with UNSC resolutions (e.g. Rice 2003; Bush 2003a; Bush 
2003e; Powell 2003a, 2003b). In particular, we find three types of argumentation. 
First, we see the dictator argument, which can be seen in accordance with both the 
humanitarian and the democratisation categories. Second, there is the security 
argument, regarding both national and international security. Third, we have the 
argument of non-compliance with UN resolutions. As we will see in the following 
section, all these arguments was repeated prior to and during the Iraq war. 
 
a) National security 
In the international dispute before the Iraq war, the US was very explicit on its 
willingness to act even without UNSC authorisation. Bush left no doubt about that 
the US would do “what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security” (ibid), and that 
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“the course of this nation does not depend on the decision of others” (Bush 2003e). 
When Britain’s participation in the war looked politically unsure, Secretary of 
Defence Donald Rumsfeld said that America didn’t even need the help of British 
forces to topple Saddam’s regime (Ash 2004: 113). 
In the preface of the US National Security Strategy from 2002 (The White House 
2002), President Bush declares that “(…) we do not use our strength to press for 
unilateral advantage”. However, this administration is, as was the Clinton 
administration, clear about the possibility of unilateral military action if this serves 
US interest:  
 
While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the 
international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to 
exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such 
terrorists (…).  
                    (The White House 2002: 6) 
 
Also, President Bush underlines that the US will not be stopped by reluctance from 
other states in the war against terrorism: “(…) Some governments will be timid in the 
face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will” (Bush 
2002a).  
US Secretary of state, Colin Powell, is also clear on this point in his speech to the 
UNSC on February 5, 2003:  
 
The United States will not and cannot run that risk (of Iraqi use of weapons of 
mass destructions) to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in 
possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is 
not an option, not in a post-September 11th world. 
                   (Powell 2003a: 18) 
 
Here, we see how Powell uses 9/11 and the fear of terror as a rationale to act. He 
underlines that non-action is dangerous, and that the United States denies to “run 
that risk”, implying that the United States will act – no matter what. 
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 In his State of the Union Address on January 20, 2004, President Bush (2004: 4) 
drew attention to the international support behind the Iraq war:  
 
From the beginning, America has sought international support for our 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and we have gained much support. There 
is a difference, however, between leading a coalition of many nations, and 
submitting to the objections of a few. America will never seek a permission slip 
to defend the security of our country.41  
 
Recalling Finnemore’s argument of the strong multilateral standards after the 
Cold War, as discussed in chapter two, Bush’s focus on international support for a 
disputed intervention is interesting. Also, the National security strategy of 2002 (The 
White House 2002: 182) underlines that the US need support from its “allies and 
friends” to defeat terrorism. Nevertheless, as Bush points out, national security 
comes first. Thus, a reformulation of Finnemore’s argument could be that 
international support is important and wanted – as long as it doesn’t hinder national 
interests. Again, I will emphasis US exceptionalism. The United States apparently 
declares a right to decide when to follow multilateral norms and not, an attitude that 
has its origin in the US exceptionalist self-image.  
 
b) International security  
The argument of international security accompanied the national security argument 
in the Iraq intervention in 2003. Again we see an argumentation that focuses on US 
responsibility and willingness to act to, so to speak, save the world from the dangers 
of the Iraqi regime.  
The Iraq intervention was based on Resolutions 1441, 678 and 687, and the aim 
was to “disarm Iraq, to free its people and defend the world from grave danger” 
(Bush 2003c). President Bush underlined that the US entered the conflict reluctantly, 
but: 
 
                                                   
41 My emphasis. 
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(…) our purpose is sure. The people of the United States and our friends and 
allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace 
with weapons of mass murder”.  
                 (ibid.) 
 
A similar argument is found in Bush’s speech to the UN on September 12, 2002: 
“Saddam Hussein’s regime is a grave and gathering danger. (…) To assume this 
regime’s good faith is to bet the lives of millions and the peace of the world in a 
reckless gamble” (Bush 2002b: 3).  
As mentioned above, the argumentation here resembles the one used to justify 
the intervention in Afghanistan: By intervening Iraq, the US does the world a favour. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell also focused on international security. E.g.: “The 
gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq’s weapons of 
mass destruction pose to the world” (Powell 2003a: 7).  In the same speech, Powell 
points at the danger of not acting against Iraq: “(…) unless we act, we are confronting 
an even more frightening future” (ibid: 17). Powell’s rhetoric has features of 
threatening propaganda, implying that non-action will have fatal consequences for 
the whole world. 
 
c) Humanitarian concerns 
Chandler (2002: 1) asserts that the US stressed the ethical and humanitarian nature of 
the military response to the 9/11 attacks – not the US national interests. This is not 
fully supported by the material analysed here, but undoubtedly, the use of 
humanitarian arguments is widespread.  
In his speech to the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2002, Bush 
emphasises the humanitarian situation in Iraq by referring to former UN resolutions 
– hence combining the humanitarian argument with the argument of international 
law. E.g.: 
 
In 1991, Security Council Resolution 688 demanded that the Iraqi regime cease 
at once the repression of its own people, including the systematic repression of 
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minorities – which the Council said, threatened international peace and 
security in the region. This demand goes ignored.  
                   (Bush 2002b: 2) 
 
As we see, Bush actually uses three types of arguments here: The humanitarian 
argument, the international law argument and the security argument. 
In the same speech, Bush accuses Saddam Hussein for bearing “full guilt for the 
hunger and misery of innocent Iraqi citizens” and warns that “If we fail to act in the 
face of danger, the people of Iraq will continue to live in brutal submission” (ibid.).  
Colin Powell emphasises the humanitarian issue in his speeches to the UN before 
the intervention. He focuses on Saddam Hussein’s human rights violations, arguing 
that “Saddam Hussein’ (…) inhumanity has no limits” (Powell 2003a: 12). By using 
such strong rhetoric, Powell tries to describe Saddam Hussein as an inhuman 
dictator who must be stopped.  
 
d) Breach with international law 
Before and during the Iraq war, the Bush administration constantly referred to 
former UN resolutions. In the previously quoted UN speech, the president referred 
to Iraq’s breach with UN resolutions from the 90s throughout his speech, e.g.: 
 
In 1991, the UN Security Council, through Resolutions 686 and 687, demanded 
that Iraq return all prisoners from Kuwait and other lands. Iraq’s regime 
agreed. It broke its promises.  
           (Bush 2002b: 2)  
 
This type of argumentation is the main characteristic in the administrations’ attempt 
to justify an attack against Iraq: Because the Iraq regime can not be trusted, the 
international community has to act to stop it.  
We also see argumentation that indicates what Lobel and Ratner (1999: 154) see as 
a US tendency of enforcing UNSC resolutions by force – with or without Council 
authorisation: “Had we failed to act, Security Council resolutions on Iraq would have 
been revealed as empty threats, weakening the United Nations an encouraging 
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defiance by dictators around the world” (Bush 2004: 3). Once more, the link to US 
exceptionalism is apparent. Bush’s argument seems to be that the UN and the 
international community must be grateful to the United States’ actions in Iraq. This is 
paradoxical: The president asserts that the United States by intervening Iraq – 
without UNSC mandate – secured the UN’s future relevance.  
In the same speech, Bush stated what could be interpreted as a message to those 
who had criticised the Iraq war for being a violation of international law:  
 
After the chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our 
enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared war on 
the United States, and war is what they got 
 (Bush 2004:3) 
 
On September 12, 2002, in an address to the UN General Assembly, President George 
W. Bush (2002b) warned Iraq that “other means” would be used unless Iraq accepted 
to be peacefully disarmed. The US threat resulted in Iraq’s acceptance of the 
immediate an unconditional return of UN and IAEA inspectors (Da Silva 2004: 214). 
In the same speech, the US president called upon the UN to prove its relevance: 
 
The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United 
Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands 
with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United 
Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to 
be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United 
Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?  
                       (Bush 2002b) 
 
The quote is interesting because Bush focuses so strongly on UN relevance and 
authority. According to the president’s argumentation, the UN has an important role 
in the international community – also from the US point of view. However, Iraq will 
be a test proving the organisations relevance. Bush is here appealing to the General 
Assembly’s sense of responsibility: If you don’t act, the UN will lose face. 
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This type of argumentation would be repeated several times during the next 
months (e.g. Bush 2003a; Bush 2003b). As Ash (2004: 11) notices, for Bush “it was not 
for the US to prove its case to the UN; it was for the UN to prove its relevance in a 
global war against evil”. Indeed, in the September 12 speech to the UN General 
Assembly Bush (2002b) was crystal clear about US intentions in the Iraqi case:  
 
We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But 
the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council 
resolutions will be enforced – the just demands of peace and security will be 
met – or action will be unavoidable.  
 
A main question in the debate was about so-called “continuing” or “existing” 
Council authorization of the use of force against Iraq.42 In November 1990, the 
Council had authorized the use of forcible means. In 2003, the US claimed that this 
authority could be used again, but several of the other veto powers refused to accept 
this deduction and demanded a new resolution (Roberts 2004). The Bush 
administration saw the previous resolutions on Iraq as sufficient. On a press 
conference on February 7, 2003, President Bush (2003b) stated that he “never felt we 
needed a resolution; 1441 speaks very clearly. It talks about serious consequences if 
he doesn’t disarm”.  
Secretary of State Powell’s main arguments were also to a very large extent based 
upon Iraq’s “material breach of its obligations”, meaning UN resolutions (e.g. Powell 
2003a: 1).  
Despite several UN resolutions; the Security Council itself never authorised the 
use of force against Iraq. Interestingly, after the war President Bush (2004) actually 
referred to the Iraq intervention as nearly being an assignment from the UN: “(…) 
Combat forces of the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Poland and other 
countries enforced the demands of the United Nations, ended the rule of Saddam 
Hussein, and the people of Iraq are free”. 43 
 
                                                   
42 This resembles the type of argumentation used by the Clinton administration when bombing Iraq in the 1990s. 
See chapter four.   
43 My emphasis.  
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e) Democratisation 
Regime change in Iraq has been a central goal in US foreign policy since the early 
1990s. The Clinton administration fully supported this, and the George W. Bush 
administration early put Iraq on top of its agenda (E.g. Thune 2003; Kagan and 
Kristol 2005). 
In the intervention of 2003, regime change seemed to be the last of many options 
in the US argumentation. The argument is used together with humanitarian 
arguments, stressing that a regime change is important to stop the suffering of the 
Iraqi people.  
The democratisation argument is not very dominant in the material analysed 
here, but is at times accompanying the more explicit arguments mentioned in the 
sections above. One example is the following quote from a presidential speech on 
February 6, 2003:  
 
All the world can rise to this moment. The community of free nations can show 
that it is strong and confident and determined to keep the peace. The United 
Nations can renew its purpose and be a source of stability and security 
dangers. And we can give the Iraqi people their chance to live in freedom and choose 
their own government.44 
                     (Bush 2003a: 2) 
 
Also, two days after the intervention started, President Bush underlined that the US 
“have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that 
country to its own people” (Bush 2003c: 1). This could clearly be interpreted as an 
argument of democratisation, focusing on “giving back Iraq to its people”.  
 
5.3.3 Legality vs. legitimacy 
The intervention of Iraq raises several questions. First, the question of implicit 
authorisation of the use of force turns up again, as discussed in chapter four. As 
Murphy (2004: 153-154) points out, it is questionable to interpret UNSC resolutions 
as implicitly authorising the use of force.  
                                                   
44 My emphasis. 
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Second, Da Silva (2004: 217) asks if the intervention respected the principle of 
proportionality, because it is debatable that the need to secure Iraq’s compliance with 
its disarmament obligations “requires the invasion and occupation of this country by 
the United States without any precise mandate from the international community”.45 
Da Silva argues that the fight against weapons of mass destruction became only one 
of the many reasons for war. This is supported by an admission by Paul Wolfowitz, 
the Bush administration’s former Deputy Defence Secretary. In an interview, 
Wolfowitz asserts that the Bush administration focused on alleged weapons of mass 
destruction because it was politically convenient and the only reason everyone could 
agree on (Usborne 2003).  
Thomas G. Weiss (2004: 41-42, 49) notices that since the catastrophic events on 
September 11, the distinction between the moral and the self-interested has become 
less pronounced, “(…) or, perhaps better stated, the threat of terrorism has added 
salience to issues that transcend preciously humanitarian dimensions”. Weiss argues 
that the Iraq war had nothing to do with humanitarian action; this was a justification 
that eventually emerged after others fell flat.  
 
5.3.4 Summary 
The US argumentation before and during the intervention of Iraq in 2003 was clearly 
dominated by arguments of national security. This was the prominent argument, but 
arguments of the other categories were also frequently used to support the argument 
of national security. In fact, my findings suggest that this intervention stands out 
from the other three analysed here, because all five argument categories were 
frequently used. Nevertheless, as seemed to be the case with all the other three 
interventions analysed here, the arguments of international security, humanitarian 
concerns, breach of international law and democratisation all appear to have the 
function of supporting the argument of national security.  
 
                                                   
45 The principle of proportionality says that a state should not take any action that exceeds that which is necessary to 
achieve the objective (Da Silva 2004:217).  
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5.4 Conclusion 
There’s no doubt that the terror attacks on September 11 2001 forced the Bush 
administration to take dramatic decisions. The interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
must be seen as steps in the Bush administration’s new war on terror. The explicit 
rationale is different in the two interventions. Regarding Afghanistan, the United 
States declared its inherent right of self-defence, and the argumentation was nearly 
exclusively based on arguments of national and international security. The 
argumentation behind the Iraq intervention was more complex. Here, all five 
argument categories were frequently used. However, the argument of national 
security seems to dominate the argumentation in this case as well. Interestingly, the 
function of the other four argument categories is apparently to strengthen the 
argument of national security. My analysis suggests that the Bush administration’s 
protection of national security has clear exceptionalist features. The US 
argumentation indicates an attitude saying the United States will not let international 
arrangements, such as the norm of non-intervention, be in its way when national 
security is threatened.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
Conclusions:  
Same content – new wrapping 
  
 
 
I think if the American people don’t know anything else about 
me, they know that I don’t like to use military force, and I do 
everything I can to avoid it. But if we have to do it, then that’s 
part of the job, and I will do it. 
 – Bill Clinton 1999b:6 
 
The path we have chosen is consistent with the great tradition of 
American foreign policy. Like the policies of Harry Truman and 
Ronald Reagan, our approach is idealistic about our national goals, 
and realistic about the means to achieve them 
- George W. Bush, in The White House 2006: preface.  
 
 
This thesis has analysed US arguments used to justify violations of the norm of non-
intervention. I have studied the position of this norm in the two administrations in 
office after the Cold War by analysing their arguments in four military interventions.  
As argued in chapter one, it is often stated that the differences between the 
presidencies of George W. Bush and Bill Clinton are substantial. Several authors and 
political thinkers argue that Bush with his doctrine of pre-emptive war has 
revolutionised American foreign policy (e.g. Daalder and Lindsay 2003; A. 
Schlesinger 2005; Melby 2004). I assert that the empirical evidence presented in the 
previous two chapters tells a different story – at least regarding the use of military 
force. This chapter will summarize the empirical findings, and line up the similarities 
– and differences – of the two administration’s intervention policy.   
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6.1 Foreign policy 
A review of all State of the Union speeches by Clinton and Bush has resulted in 
several interesting observations. One is that foreign policy clearly occupies a larger 
part in Bush’s speeches than Clinton’s. This is worth noticing, considering the fact 
that Bush during his campaign for office in 2000 paid very little attention to foreign 
policy. Of course, the war against terrorism is an explanation here, and we can 
definitely conclude that Bush has been forced to focus more on international matters 
than he might have intended before taking office.  
Through the Bush Doctrine, the concept of pre-emptive strike has become a well-
known part of American security strategy. However, the idea is not new. In US 
National Security Strategy of 1997, the Clinton administration explicitly opens up for 
the possibility of pre-emption. In the chapter on terrorism, the strategy states: “U.S. 
counter-terrorism approaches are meant to prevent, disrupt and defeat terrorist 
operations before they occur” and  “(…) as long as terrorists continue to target 
American citizens and interests, we reserve the right to strike at their bases and 
attack assets valued by those who support them” (The White House 1997: 13). We 
also see a similar language in the US arguments on military action in Iraq and 
Kosovo and in e.g. the National security strategy of 1994: “US forces must be 
prepared to deter, prevent and defend against the use of weapons of mass 
destruction” (The White House 1994: 11). 
Here, I would like to shortly consider Zhiyuan Cui’s (2004: 242-244) discussion on 
how Chinese intellectuals view the so-called Bush Doctrine. Interestingly, Cui says, 
while many European intellectuals tend to perceive the Bush Doctrine as a break 
with Clinton’s foreign policy, the Chinese emphasise the continuity of the Doctrine 
with Clintons’ foreign policy. Cui quotes Kaplan and Kristol, who stress that Clinton 
resorted to force without UN approval on several occasions. They emphasise a quote 
by Clinton’s UN ambassador Richard Holbrooke: “Act without the Security Council, 
or don’t act at all” (ibid.).  
This thesis has not been a comprehensive study of US foreign policy, but rather 
been limited to the use of force. To draw conclusions about the similarities and 
differences between the two administrations’ general foreign policy is thus 
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impossible. However, the analysis has resulted in interesting findings about their 
intervention policy. The material analysed here suggests that regarding the 
arguments for the use of force, the two administrations seem to differ more on form 
than on content. The administrations rank the argument types slightly different, but 
apparently, they share the view that nothing is more important than national 
security. I will return to the ranking of the arguments under 6.4.  
 
6.2 Licensed to democratise  
A phenomenon that clearly plays a crucial role in the foreign policy of both 
administrations is the spread of democracy and the so-called American values of 
liberalism. This resembles Woodrow Wilson’s idea of a “manifest destiny” to lead 
and improve the world, as discussed in chapter three. Seemingly, the spread of 
democracy is gaining ground to such an extent that it may challenge the principle of 
sovereignty. The US focus on regime change as an explicit goal in the Iraq 
intervention of 2003 can be regarded as an example of such a trend. As we have seen, 
regime change has been central in the argumentation of US intervention policy in the 
cases analysed here, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Regime change and democratisation is not new to American foreign policy. The 
United States has in several occasions supported oppositional forces in attempts to 
overthrow unpopular regimes. Daalder and Lindsay (2003: 14) assert that the Bush 
administration stands out from former administrations with its willingness to use 
military forces to topple other governments – even in the absence of a direct attack 
on the United States.  However, as shown in chapter five, the Clinton administration 
also put regime change and democratisation high on its foreign policy agenda.  
In his State of the Union Address in 1994, Bill Clinton (1994: 11) sums it all up in a 
few lines: “Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable 
peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack 
each other” – the last line obviously referring to the concept of democratic peace.46 In 
retrospective, we might see this as a summary of US intervention policy after the 
Cold War.  
                                                   
46 For a discussion of this concept, see e.g. Bruce Russett (1990): Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of 
National Security and Immanuel Kant (1957): Perpetual peace.  
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Democratisation is a basic theme in the national security strategies of both 
administrations. In both the National security strategy from 1994 and from 1997, the 
Clinton administration (The White House 1994 and 1997) expresses the promotion of 
democracy and human rights abroad as one of three core objectives of the national 
security strategy. In the equivalent documents of the Bush administration (The White 
House 2002 and 2006), there is almost an inflation when it comes to the use of the 
word “democracy”. Clearly, the administration has made the spread of democracy, 
together with the war on terror, its first priority in its foreign policy. E.g.: 
 
To protect our Nation and honour our values, the United States seeks to extend 
freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and 
to promote effective democracy.  
                                                                                     (The White House 2006: 8)  
 
Again, we see Wilsonian features in the argumentation. Wilson’s idea was that the 
United States should join World War I because “the world must be made safe for 
democracy” (Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 6). This is very much the same type of 
language visible in the both administration’s documents and speeches.  
Iraq is a repeated issue in this picture of democratisation. The Bush 
administration put regime change in Iraq on the top of its foreign policy agenda, but 
as we have seen in chapter four, the Clinton administration also explicitly 
emphasised this as an important goal. 47  
In an extensive defence of the Iraq war, Kagan and Kristol (2005: 18-19) argue that 
liberating the Iraqi people from a brutal dictatorship was by itself a sufficient reason 
to remove Saddam. The moral and humanitarian purpose provided a compelling 
reason for a war against Iraq, and “should certainly have been compelling to those 
(like us) who supported the war on Slobodan Milosevic (…)” (ibid.). They see the 
Bush administration’s Iraq policy as a continuation of the Clinton administration’s 
line on the field – a line leading towards regime change in Iraq:  
 
                                                   
47 See discussion under 4.2.1 about the democratisation argument.  
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The Bush administration’s approach to Iraq was fundamentally keeping in 
with that of the Clinton administration, except that after September 11, inaction 
seemed even less capable.  
           (ibid: 26)  
 
The Bush administration was, even more than the Clinton administration, convinced 
that to topple Saddam was the only solution of the Iraq issue. The temporary support 
for the process following Resolution 1441 was a concession to international and 
domestic pressure. In the Bush administration, no senior official believed in Iraqi 
compliance with the resolution. The administration’s hope, however, was that once 
Saddam’s non-compliance became clear, a unanimous UNSC would give green light 
for a war against Iraq (ibid: 27). As we know, this green light never came. Yet, the 
Bush administration acted – as did the Clinton administration in the 1990s.  
Lobel and Ratner (1999: 154) claim that the US position “is that it will enforce 
Security Council resolutions by force, whether or not the Council sees fit to do so”. 
This observation is supported by the empirical analysis in this thesis, and as we have 
seen, the position can be found in both the Clinton and Bush administrations48.  
 
6.3 The exceptional nation 
A striking feature of the empirical material analysed here, is both administrations’ 
strong focus on the United States’ powerful position in the international community 
and the United States’ right and duty to act as the world’s leading nation. 
International leadership is seen as compelling for securing the US strong position. 
The following example is from the Clinton administration’s National Security 
Strategy of 1997: “To be secure and prosperous, America must continue to lead” (The 
White House 1997: 37). The administration focused strongly on American leadership, 
and the importance of protecting US interests and values. E.g.: “(W)here our interests 
and our values are at stake, and where we can make a difference, America must lead. 
We must not be isolationist” (Clinton 1996: 11). 
                                                   
48 See e.g. discussion of the Clinton administration in Iraq, and likewise, the Bush administration and the Iraq war 
in 2003.  
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The aim of being the “world’s leading force for peace” repeats itself in the 
administration’s language (e.g. The White House 1997: 37; Clinton 1996):  
 
We must not be the world’s policeman. But we can and should be the world’s 
very best peacemaker. By keeping our military strong, by using diplomacy 
where we can and force where we must, by working with others to share the 
risk and the cost of our efforts, America is making a difference for people here 
and around the world. 
                   (Clinton 1996: 11) 
 
We find the same attitude in the Bush administration: “History has called America 
and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight 
freedom’s fight” (Bush 2002a). Even though Bush includes the United States’ allies, it 
is possible to interpret this quote as a clear expression of exceptionalism. The United 
States has a special mission in the world, and has a responsibility to fulfil it.  
A similar attitude is visible in President Bush’s preface to the National Security 
Strategy of 2006:  
 
Effective multilateral efforts are essential to solve these problems. Yet history 
has shown that only when we do our part, will others do theirs. America must 
continue to lead.    
        (Bush, in The White House 2006: preface) 
 
Here, Bush’s message is hard to misunderstand: Yes, multilateralism is good, but US 
leadership is essential to solving problems. Hence, Bush sums up what I see as one of 
the most prominent characteristics of the United States’ exceptionalist self-image: 
When action is needed, the United States will not let itself be stopped by multilateral 
arrangements. As chapters four and five have indicated, this has also implications for 
the US attitude to the norm of non-intervention. Is the United States convinced of the 
necessity of using military force, it will violate the norm of non-intervention even 
without an international mandate given by the UNSC. 
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6.4 A hierarchy of arguments 
Finally, I have attempted to organise a hierarchy of values/arguments of the two 
administrations, considering military intervention. The ranking is based on the 
analysis in the previous chapters.  
 
The Clinton administration:  
1) National security 
2) International security 
3) Humanitarian concerns 
4) International law 
5) Democratisation 
 
The Bush administration:  
1) National Security 
2) International Security 
3) Democratisation 
4) Humanitarian Concerns  
5) International Law 
 
My analysis indicates that national security/interest is the first and foremost 
argument for military intervention in both administrations. This has not changed 
considerably from Clinton to Bush. If the national security of the United States is 
threatened or violated, there has to be very compelling reasons to stop US action. 
The argument of international security is often used to support arguments of 
national security. Interestingly, this argument hence seems to have the function of 
showing the international community that action is necessary – not only to protect 
US interests, but to protect international security. The argument is particularly 
evident in the Iraq cases analysed here.  
The administrations differ more on the last three categories: Democratisation, 
humanitarian concerns and international law.  While democracy and regime change 
is a central part of the Bush administration’s language, humanitarian concerns are 
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not paid much attention. In the Clinton administration, on the contrary, the 
humanitarian argument is frequently used, while the argument of democratisation is 
not that evident and plays a more implicit part, often in arguments about US 
responsibility to spread American values.  
One finding that have surprised me in this study, were my observations of the 
use of international law arguments. I had expected larger variations between the 
administrations in this category. In the interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the 
argument of international law was practically absent. In Iraq, on the other hand, both 
administrations used this argument extensively.  
I have already considered the two presidents’ doctrines. The easy way is to say 
that while the Bush Doctrine is one of pre-emptive war, the Clinton Doctrine is one of 
humanitarian intervention. However, as discussed in chapter four, the Clinton 
administration was quite selective in its humanitarian concerns and international 
action for human rights. A more correct definition of a Clinton doctrine might be 
humanitarian intervention for strategic reasons.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The findings of this thesis suggest that the two administrations differ more in 
rhetoric than in substance regarding the use of military force. The arguments are 
presented differently, but the content is to a large extent the same.  
In the cases analysed here, US national security was used as the first and foremost 
reason for US intervention. Arguments focusing on other factors, such as 
international security and humanitarian concerns, are to a large extent used to 
accompany the argument of national security. The American message to the world is 
often that the rationale behind an intervention goes far beyond the protection of US 
interest: By protecting ourselves, we are protecting you. 
In the popular and simplified categorisation of Clinton and Bush as, respectively, 
a multilateralist and a unilateralist president, the historical context is apparently 
shown too little attention. The policy of the Bush administration has been highly 
influenced by the events of 9/11. It is, if not impossible, at least very difficult, to say 
how the Clinton administration would have reacted to the terror attacks in 
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September 2001. Any such assumption would be hypothetically and speculative. 
However, to label the foreign policy, at least on the use of force, of the Bush 
administration as being revolutionary, is jumping to conclusions too easily. The 
Clinton administration’s record on this field does not tell a story of complete 
multilateralism. In fact, this administration showed an outspoken willingness to act 
unilaterally “when we must” (The White House 1997:5).  
What seems to be more important to US intervention policy than person and 
political party, is the long American tradition of exceptionalism, which seems to 
affect both presidents strongly. US exceptionalism seems to result in a United States 
placing itself above international arrangements and norms, claiming a right to act 
unilaterally. The findings of this thesis indicate that as long as US conviction, 
resources and will of action are present, intervention will eventually happen. Yes, 
both administrations have consulted, or at least informed, the Security Council and 
the international community before they acted. But, at the end of the road, both the 
Clinton and the Bush administration have demonstrated what I see as a very evident 
feature of hegemonic power in a unipolar world: If national security or American 
values are threatened, and the world does nothing to prevent it, the United States 
will act. 
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